Serving No  Purpose:  The Double-Edged Sword of New York\u27s Juvenile Offender Law by Charles, Rose M. & Zuccarelli, Jennifer V.
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 12 
Issue 3 Volume 12, Summer 1997, Issue 3 Article 15 
June 1997 
Serving No "Purpose:" The Double-Edged Sword of New York's 
Juvenile Offender Law 
Rose M. Charles 
Jennifer V. Zuccarelli 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Charles, Rose M. and Zuccarelli, Jennifer V. (1997) "Serving No "Purpose:" The Double-Edged Sword of 
New York's Juvenile Offender Law," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 12 : Iss. 3 , 
Article 15. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol12/iss3/15 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES
SERVING NO "PURPOSE": THE DOUBLE-
EDGED SWORD OF NEW YORK'S JUVENILE
OFFENDER LAW
Perceived fears of uncontrollable criminal activity across the
nation have caused people to further lose confidence in what is
already viewed as a failing criminal justice system. I These feel-
ings manifest themselves in communities' demands for more ag-
gressive state intervention. 2 In particular, escalation in the
1 See Jory Farr, Fear Reigns While Crime Tales Plunge, PRESS ENTERPRISE, Feb. 25,
1997, at A4 (noting that although FBI figures report national homicide rate decreasing
for fourth consecutive year, public fear of crime remains high); see also Attorney General
Janet Reno, Fighting Youth Violence: The Future Is Now, 11 Sum. CRIM. JUST. 30, 30
(1996) (recognizing drop in nationwide crime rates partly due to increases in police force);
cf. David Jackson, Organizations Work Toward a More Civic Society, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 12, 1997, at 1J (discussing National Commission on Civic Renewal's survey of
public disillusionment finding that 67% of Americans feel "U.S. is in a long-term moral
decline"). But see Fox Butterfield, Rape at Lowest Level in a Decade, Report Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at Al (noting nationwide police report that rapes reported in 1995
have dropped to 97,000 which was lowest since 1989 according to Justice Department).
2 See, e.g., Mary Wisnewski Holden, State's Prosecutors Eyeing Bill for Juvenile Jus-
tice Reform, CHICAGO LAW. Feb. 1997, at 8 (discussing Illinois legislative committee's
emphasis on holding serious youth offenders accountable for crimes and focusing on
community safety). But see, e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Ju-
veniles to Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 NOTRE
DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 281, 281 (1991) (suggesting traditional preference for
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number of serious juvenile crimes 3 has sparked a re-evaluation
of the purpose behind a separate juvenile system. 4
Historically, the fundamental notion that youths are unable to
fully comprehend the consequences of their actions served as the
basis for the adoption of a separate juvenile justice system. 5
handling juvenile delinquency was rehabilitation and supervision); Robert E. Shepherd,
Jr., What Does the Public Really Want?, 11 Spring-CRIM. JUST. 51, 52 (1996) (presenting
results of survey indicating that public preference is toward rehabilitation model in ju-
venile justice as opposed to punitive measures).
3 See Ralph A. Rossum, Reforming Juvenile Justice and Improving Juvenile Charac-
ter: The Case for the Justice Model, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 823, 823-24 (1996) (reporting FBI
juvenile crime statistics: Serious crime increased by 4.5% from 1994 and 13.8% from
1990; violent crime increased by 5.7% from 1994 and 29.9% from 1990; juveniles commit
16% of all murders and non-negligent manslaughter, 15.6% of all aggravated assaults,
16.3% of all forcible rapes, 32.0% of all robberies, 33.4% of all larcenies, 36.2% of all bur-
glaries, and 55.3% of all arsons); Shepard, supra note 2, at 51 (noting results of random
survey of adults across United States concerning their perceptions of juvenile crime indi-
cated perception of increase in juvenile crimes). But see Kevin Heubusch, Teens on the
Trigger, AMER. DEMOGRAPHICS, Feb. 1, 1997, at 24 (questioning accuracy of 1995 FBI
teen crime report which he claims is misleading since numbers vary yearly depending on
which local agencies voluntarily file reports); Mike Hudson, Experts Say Some Crime
Statistics Used to Further Certain Causes, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Feb. 23,
1997, at 1 (discussing local politicians abusing Virginia's increase, as opposed to national
decrease, in juvenile arrests, which does not indicate increase in juvenile crime, to justify
more punitive approach to crime); Bruce Shapiro, Behind the Bell Curve, Decline in Ju-
venile Crime, NATION, Jan. 6, 1997, at 5 (reporting latest Justice Department figures forjuvenile crime); Lisa Stansky, Age of Innocence: More and More States are Telling Teens:
If You do an Adult Crime, You Serve the Adult Time, 82 Nov. A.B.A. J. 60, 62 (1996)
(according to 1996 Update to Violence from Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention at U.S. Justice Department, six percent of all ten to seventeen year olds were
arrested in 1994, but only one-half of one percent of juveniles were arrested for violent
crimes).
4 See Korine L. Larsen, With Liberty and Juvenile Justice For All: Extending the
Right to a Jury Trial to the Juvenile Courts, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 835, 846 (1994)
(indicating fact that severe repeat juvenile offenders, comprising twenty percent of all
delinquents yet committing about two thirds of all offenses, shows that juvenile courts
fail in their role as rehabilitator); see also Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified
Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927, 931-33 (1995)
[hereinafter Response to Critics] (chronicling development of split system of criminal jus-
tice beginning with nineteenth century Progressive movement); Holly Beatty, Is the
Trend to Expand Juvenile Transfer Statute Just an Easy Answer to Complex Problem?,
26 U. TOL. L. REV. 979, 992-93 (1995) (discussing differences between punishment, de-
priving offender of liberty through confinement, and treatment, focusing on individual's
future return to society).
5 See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imaging Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Or-
der: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1120 (1991)
[hereinafter Reimaging Childhood] (noting that court professionals assume juveniles are
incapable of exercising sound judgment); Beatty, supra note 4, at 979 (discussing Pro-
gressive belief that juvenile crime resulted from external forces of society rather than
internal will of child, and therefore focused on treatment rather than punishment); Don-
ald J. Harris, Due Process v. Helping Kids in Trouble: Implementing the Right to Appealfrom Adjudication to Delinquency in Pennsylvania, 98 DICK. L. REV. 209, 226 (1993)
(noting general consensus of lawyers is that adolescents do not have ability to exercise
sound discretion). See generally Melissa M. Weldon, Fiscal Restraints Trump Due Proc-
ess: Children's Diminishing Right to Counsel in Minnesota, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 647, 650-
56 (1996) (discussing evolution of segregated system and recent challenges to its effec-
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Prosecuting children as adults failed to address the child's lack
of mental culpability. 6 Thus, a separate juvenile court system
was implemented with the intention of filling the justicial void
left by the adult criminal justice system. 7 From its inception,
the ideal goal of the juvenile justice system was to rehabilitate
rather than punish8 the child offender-a marked departure
tiveness).
6 See Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Court Legislation Reformed and the Serious Young Of-
fender: Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal", 65 MINN. L. REV 167, 170 (1981)
[hereinafter Dismantling the Rehabilitative Ideal] (noting those who believed juveniles
did not possess requisite maturity and culpability associated with adult crimes should be
deemed less blameworthy as well as more susceptible to treatment and rehabilitation);
Lourdes M. Rosado, Minors and the Fourth Amendment: How Juvenile Status Should
Invoke Different Standards for Searches and Seizures on the Street, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
762, 778 (1996) (addressing Supreme Court recognition that minors are generally less
mature than adults and therefore more vulnerable to coercive interrogation tactics); see
also Eric J. Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, An Assessment of Legislative Approaches to the
Problem of Serious Juvenile Crime: A Case Study of Texas 1973-1995, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L.
563, 565-66 (1996) (referring to "child saving" movement supported by proponent's desire
to treat juvenile criminals in less blameworthy fashion); Ellen R. Fulmer, Novak v.
Commonwealth. Are Virginia Courts Avoiding Special Protection to Virginia's Juvenile
Defendants?, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 935, 935 (1996) (citing Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599
(1948)) (reasoning that child of fifteen years "cannot be judged by the more exacting
standards of maturity... [t]hat which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can over-
awe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens").
7 The juvenile court was founded upon the doctrine of parens patriae to protect the
particular needs of the child. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). Literally
"parent of the country," the term parens patriae refers to the role of the state as guardian
of persons under "legal disability," including, but not limited to, juveniles and the insane,
as well as in issues of child custody. Id.; see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
554-555 (1966). The Supreme Court, however, has limited the use of a state's power as
parens patriae to deprive a person of his liberty. Id. This doctrine serves to put the State
in the position of acting in the child's best interest as opposed to the adversarial position
of prosecutor and judge. Id. Parens patriae gives the states the power to care for those
who are not able to care for themselves. Id. The motivation that created this court was a
desire to protect and reform juvenile offenders. Id.; West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
440 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir. 1971). The doctrine has also been applied by the states in
order to recover damages for "quasi-sovereign interests" without bearing on individuals
residing within the state, such as the general health and welfare of the people, interstate
rights, and the economic interests of the state. Id.
8 See Beatty, supra note 4, at 979 (discussing ongoing debate concerning primary
goal of juvenile court system as one of rehabilitation as opposed to punishment); Jan C.
Costello & Nancy L. Worthington, Incarcerating Statue Offenders: Attempts to Circum-
vent the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 41, 81 n.4
(1981) (noting developers of nineteenth century philosophy of rehabilitation rejected
adult criminal court perception of punishment/deterrence as method of rehabilitation,
opting instead for "treatment" of juvenile offenders); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court
Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68
B.U. L. REV. 821, 824 (1988) [hereinafter Principle of Offense] (discussing origins of ju-
venile treatment in terms of medical concepts borrowed by criminology); Martin L. Forst
& Martha-Elm Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth
Connections, 5 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323, 324-25 (1991) (presenting
late nineteenth century philosophy of rehabilitative treatment model, in which state's
responsibility was to act in best interests of child regardless of whether child was consid-
ered dependent or delinquent).
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from the adult system.9
Although notable in its purpose, juvenile justice systems have
recently been criticized. 10 In response to such criticism, nation-
wide crime control agendas were created to appease the public
outcry to "get tough"11 on juvenile criminals. 12 The public is de-
manding that juveniles be treated similarly to their adult coun-
terparts. 13 This Note contends, however, that these legislative
initiatives do not comport with the rehabilitative goal of juvenile
9 See In re Holmes, 109 A.2d 523, 524 (Pa. 1954) (stating concept of juvenile courts is
to inquire as to appropriate treatment and methods of rehabilitation for minors); Princi-
ple of Offense, supra note 8, at 848 (noting juvenile judicial inquiry focuses on preventing
further delinquency not on youth's prior conduct); Marcia Johnson, Juvenile Justice, 17
WHITTIER L. REV. 713, 846 (1996) (presenting benefits of juvenile system as "the non-
criminal dispositional nature of the proceedings, anonymity, a greater focus on rehabili-
tation, and more humane institutions"); Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L.
REV. 104, 119-20 (1909) (noting judges emphasize therapeutic nature of juvenile court
intervention).
10 See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 8, at 327-28 (noting criticisms leveled at all as-
pects of juvenile court system); see also Reno, supra note 1, at 32 (recognizing that in-
crease in serious youth crime can only be combated by revamping existing systems and
implementing new system similar to specialized drug courts); Anna L. Simpson, Reha-
bilitation as the Justification of a Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CAL. L. REV. 984,
1003-17 (1976) (criticizing rehabilitative purpose of juvenile justice systems, further pro-
posing that juvenile systems should mirror adult criminal justice system).
11 See Julianne P. Scheffer, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes: Recon-
ciling Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 479, 491 (1995) (discussing "get tough" statutory reform as way to achieve punitive
goals).
12 See Rossum, supra note 3, at 838. The author's proposed initial step in the reform-
ing juvenile justice system is the creation of a "justice model", which achieves dual goals
of holding both juveniles and the public responsible for their respective committed crimes
and imposed punishments. Id. See, e.g., Barbara Walsh, Cottage 9: Last Chance for Sex
Offender's, Boys in Youth Center's Cottage 9 Work at Self-control, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, March 9, 1997, at 1A. As a last chance for disturbed young murderers and rap-
ists to redeem themselves, Maine has implemented a militant treatment program. Id.
13 See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 8, at 333-34 (noting some legislators believed
inadequacies in juvenile justice system could be curtailed by either removing some
classes of youthful offenders from juvenile justice system or making juvenile system itself
more punitive by changing its underlying philosophies and goals); Linda F. Giardino,
Statutory Rhetoric: The Reality Behind Juvenile Justice Policies in America, 5 J.L. &
POL'Y 223, 259 (1996) (suggesting juvenile courts exercise choice between juvenile reha-
bilitation and punitive nature of adult system when relinquishing jurisdiction); Marcy
Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Practice: Persistence,
Seriousness and Race, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 73, 82-83 (1995) (transferring selected youthful
offenders to adult criminal courts serves as "safety valve" to shield juvenile justice sys-
tem from its critics); see also Michael Kennedy Burke, This Old Court: Abolitionists Once
Again Line Up the Wrecking Ball on the Juvenile Court When All it Needs Is a Few Minor
Alterations, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 1027, 1051-52 (1995) (advocating that Ohio system for
judicial waiver into adult criminal court should be limited to first and second degree
felonies); Douglas A. Hager, Does the Texas Juvenile Waiver Statute Comport With the
Requirements of Due Process?, 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 813, 830-31 (1995) (noting waiver
decision is choice between adult's punitive criminal forum and juvenile's rehabilitative
setting). See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-803(1) (1990) (defining "violent offender"
as one who has committed violent specified crime).
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courts. 14
Legislative adjustments to the juvenile justice system have at-
tempted to satisfy the public demand for a "law and order" ap-
proach to juvenile crime. 15 The twin aims of rehabilitation and
prevention, thus, have been replaced by those of control and
punishment. 16 The New York electorate has not been immune to
this growing sentiment. 17 The State's Juvenile Offender Law of
197818 ("JOL") is considered one of the most punitive and re-
14 See Giardino, supra note 13, at 230 (stating "unfortunately the shift toward the
punishment of the child, as opposed to rehabilitation, hinders the juvenile justice system
from providing effective treatment to serious juvenile offenders").
15 See Sheffer, supra note 11, at 486-87 (presenting current legislative trend of mov-
ing to punishmentf'just deserts" model, using California Code as example); Weldon, su-
pra note 5, at 674-75 (theorizing that juvenile courts are no longer solely concerned with
best interests of child but also consider public needs); see also Principle of Offense, supra
note 8, at 909-14 (analyzing move toward philosophy of punishment in juvenile court sys-
tem). See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62.211(2)(b) (Michie Supp. 1993) (allowing
juvenile court to impose on serious youth offenders "any other punitive measure the
court determines to be in the best interest of the public"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-20
(West 1987) (stating "this bill recognizes that the public welfare... can be served most
effectively through an approach which provides for harsher penalties for juveniles who
commit serious acts or who are repetitive offenders"); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2)
(1988) (describing purpose of juvenile court as giving "punishment commensurate with
the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender").
16 States have enacted statutes that specifically impose harsher sentencing guide-
lines for serious youth offenders. See ALA. CODE § 12-15.71.1 (1975 & Supp. 1994); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 500 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-803
(1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-140(e) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.058 (West 1988); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 705, § 405/1-8.1 (West 1994); IOWA CODE § 232.22 (1992); MO. REV. STAT. §
260.185.2(b) (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-103(24) (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.135
(1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-44 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-15.3 (Michie
1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.05 (McKinney 1987); OKLA. STAT. § 1160.1 (1991); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 14-1-7 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-137 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-330.1
(Mlichie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.160 (1993).
17 See Bruce Shapiro, Behind the Bell Curve, Decline in Juvenile Crime, NATION, Jan.
6, 1997, at 5. New York State Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver's speech to Citizens
Crime Commission of New York City reflected Diluio's "superpredator" thesis and pre-
dicted an insurmountable wave of juvenile crime. Id. In response to the anticipated in-
crease in juvenile crime, Sheldon Silver proposed that children convicted of any crime get
"a taste of punishment" rather than probation. Id.
18 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1987). The statute states:
A person thirteen, fourteen or fifteen years of age is criminally responsible for acts
constituting murder in the second degree as defined in subdivisions one and two of §
125.25 and in subdivision three of such section provided that the underlying crime
for the murder charge is one for which such person is criminally responsible; and a
person fourteen or fifteen years of age is criminally responsible for acts constituting
the crimes defined in § 135.25 (kidnapping in the first degree); 150.20 (arson in the
first degree); subdivisions one and two of § 120.10 (assault in the first degree); 125.20
(manslaughter in the first degree); subdivisions one and two of § 130.35 (rape in the
first degree); subdivisions one and two of § 130.50 (sodomy in the first degree);
130.70 (aggravated sexual abuse); 140.30 (burglary in the first degree); subdivision
one of § 140.25 (burglary in the second degree); 150.15 (arson in the second degree);
160.15 (robbery in the first degree) or subdivision two of § 160.10 (robbery in the sec-
ond degree) of this chapter; or defined in this chapter as an attempt to commit mur-
1997]
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gressive juvenile laws in the country, making New York a leader
in punitive reform of the juvenile system. 19
This Note provides a brief history of the juvenile justice system
in the United States and the philosophies underlying its devel-
opment. Part II discusses the trend of transforming juvenile
courts from a rehabilitative system into an increasingly retribu-
tive system. Part III examines New York's response to this
trend through legislative enactment, which truncates the juve-
nile courts' intended mission as rehabilitative institutions. It is
submitted that New York's JOL frustrates the rehabilitative
mission of juvenile courts by abandoning the best interests of the
child standard, thereby favoring community protection. It is also
submitted that the dual goals of serving the best interests of the
juvenile offender and promoting public safety may be consistent
in that rehabilitation assures a safe community. It is further
submitted that the New York system, which voids the original
jurisdiction and judicial discretion of the Family Court when
dealing with serious youth offenders, should be revamped. This
Note contends that a system, which empowers the Family Court
with authority over all juvenile offense cases, will better serve to
rehabilitate the juvenile offender as well as to protect the com-
munity at large.
I. SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDERS - YESTERDAY: THE RISE
OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Underlying Philosophies of the Traditional Juvenile Court
Prior to the eighteenth century, the law did not treat juvenile
offenders differently than adult criminals. 20 This classic view
der in the second degree or kidnapping in the first degree.
Id.
19 See John N. Kane, Jr., Note, Dipositional Authority and Decision Making in New
York's Juvenile Justice System: Discretion at Risk, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 925, 927 (1994)
(recognizing New York's Juvenile Offender Law to be one of most punitive and regressive
in America); see also Stacey Sabo, Rights of Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile
Court Jurisdiction, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2434-36 (1996) (discussing criticisms of
New York's juvenile court's effectiveness and resulting changes in legislation occurring in
1970's as result of skyrocketing juvenile crime rates).
20 See Kane, supra note 19, at 929-30 (treating children in same manner as adult
criminals followed English colonists to America in seventeenth century); see also
ToRJANoWicZ AND MORASH, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: CONCEPTS AND CONTROL 181 (3d
ed. 1983) (during end of 19th century, England embraced concept of parens patriae, "role
[Vol. 12:721
THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
treated children and adults alike, thus a child convicted of politi-
cal treason could be executed. 21 During the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, however, the United States wit-
nessed doctrinal changes in policies concerning juveniles. 22 The
Positivist's theory23 replaced the classic view, 24 recognizing dif-
ferent reasons for juvenile criminal behavior. 25 This new phi-
losophy was instrumental in establishing New York's House of
Refuge in 1824.26 This institution, along with similar counter-
parts established in other states, sought to decrease the harsh
effect of placing novice offenders with seasoned criminals.
27
The House of Refuge and organizations like it, however, failed
to achieve their rehabilitative goals. 28 In 1889, the Progressive
Reform movement effectively eliminated the difficulties that
these institutions were facing.29 The proponents of this doctrine
of the King acting as parent when no parents existed to protect the rights of the child" to
address concerns for destitute and delinquent youths).
21 See CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 51 (3d ed. 1991)
(discussing prior to eighteenth century children were drowned, hung, and burned alive
for political treason).
22 See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV.
691, 693 (1991) [hereinafter Transformation] (suggesting that due to developments in
science and industrialization, society took notice of need to treat children differently due
to lack of comprehension and experience); Deborah L. Mills, United States v. Johnson:
Acknowledging the Shift in the Juvenile Court System From Rehabilitation to Punish-
ment, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 903, 906-09 (1996) (suggesting that move from rural, agricul-
tural society to modern, urban-industrial society contributed to need to separate adult
and juvenile criminal justice systems, as did developing views towards family structure).
See generally Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the
Criminal Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 143 (1984) [hereinafter Criminalizing Juvenile
Justice] (noting social problems which accompanied modernization of society); Principle
of Offense, supra note 8, at 473-74 (discussing radical changes United States was experi-
encing during end of nineteenth century to beginning of twentieth century as result of
railroads, influx of immigrants, and urbanization which caused shift in causes of crime).
23 See Mills, supra note 22, at 908-909 (according to Positivists "biological, psycho-
logical, sociological, cultural and physical" forces in environment caused criminal behav-
ior).
24 See Principle of Offense, supra note 8, at 821 (describing classic view holding eve-
ryone accountable for all actions since people have free will); Mills, supra note 22, at 907-
08 (reflecting classical view as giving "willed" criminals harsh sentences to "unwill" their
criminal tendencies).
25 See Mills, supra note 22, at 906-07 (noting changes in American lifestyle at turn of
century motivated movement to rectify accompanying problems).
26 See CECIL P. REMICH, THE HOUSE OF REFUGE 168 (1975); see also Kane, supra note
19, at 934.
27 See Kane, supra note 19, at 930 (describing purpose of House, deriving its power
from parens patriae, was to rehabilitate children under sixteen and provide individual-
ized treatment).
28 See id. at 931 (setting forth criticism of New York's House of Refuge as not being
effective, refocusing on punishment rather than rehabilitation, and abhorrent condi-
tions).
29 See generally Gary A. Debele & Wright S. Walling, Private Chips Petitions in Min-
19971
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initiated the first separate juvenile court system in Illinois.30
The Progressives envisioned a model juvenile court as a benevo-
lent treatment agency31 making dispositions in the "best interest
of the child."32
B. Ideologies of the Traditional Juvenile Court
The retributive agenda of adult courts traditionally precluded
any rehabilitation for the "hardened adult criminal mind."33 This
lack of rehabilitation prompted legislators to set up a separate
system for juveniles distinguished by its rehabilitative goal. 34
nesota: The Historical and Contemporary Treatment of Children in Need of Protection or
Services, 20 WM. ITCHELL L. REV. 781, 794-797 (1994) (suggesting views of wealthy elite
led to protecting children during Progressive Era).
30 See Kelly Keimig Elsea, The Juvenile Crime Debate: Rehabilitation, Punishment,
or Prevention, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 135, 137 (1995) (following Illinois' creation of
separate Juvenile Court, only two states as of 1912 were without such systems); Frank
Sullivan, Jr., Indiana As a Forerunner in the Juvenile Court Movement, 30 IND. L. REV.
279, 281-82 (1997) (discussing Illinois legislature's use of parens patriae in creating first
juvenile court in 1899); Alan J. Tompkins et al., Subtle Discrimination in Juvenile Jus-
tice Decisionmaking: Social Scientific Perspectives and Explanations, 29 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1619, 1622 (1996) (noting inception of first separate juvenile court in Illinois was
result of public disapproval of imprisoning juveniles with adults); Adam D. Kamenstein,
Note, The Inner-Morality of Juvenile Justice: The Case for Consistency & Legality, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 2105, 2108 (1997) (embodying Progressive movement, Illinois Juvenile
Court Act of 1899 led to reevaluation across nation of treatment of youth criminals).
31 See Transformation, supra note 22, at 693-95 (explaining underlying theory be-
hind Progressive movement toward separate juvenile system as their belief "that benevo-
lent state action guided by experts could alleviate social ills...").
32 See Jeffrey Fagan and Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, Determinants of Judicial
Waiver for Violent Juvenile Offenders, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 314, 318 (1990)
(noting that in deciding what was "in the best interest of the child" juvenile courts were
to investigate youths background to determine if they could be rehabilitated); cf. Lisa A.
Cintron, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile Transfers to Adult
Criminal Court, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1254, 1258 (1996) (promoting position that children
are not fully responsible for their actions and therefore should not be punished for them);
see also Mills, supra note 22, at 910 (noting juvenile reform movement raised age of
criminal responsibility from seven to eighteen in thirty eight states and District of Co-
lumbia).
33 See Cintron, supra note 32, at 1260 (focusing on deprivation of liberty and pun-
ishment as repayment for crime committed, adult system does not serve to rehabilitate to
degree necessary for juvenile offenders); Hager, supra note 13, at 824 (choosing adult
system or juvenile system when making waiver decisions demands consideration of con-
sequences of retributive agenda of adult justice system); Scott Harshbarger & Carolyn
Keshian, The Attorney General of Massachusetts'Bill Relative to the Trial and Sentencing
of Serious Juvenile Offenders, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 135, 136 (1996) (noting adult sys-
tem's attention to nature of offense and need for public safety contrasts with juvenile's
need for emphasis on both circumstances of offense and offender themselves).
34 See Ex Parte Daedler, 228 P. 467, 471 (Cal. 1924) (holding rationale of Juvenile
Court Act is to benefit both offender and society by showing juvenile how to be productive
member of society as opposed to solely punishing child); Sherri Jackson, Too Young to
Die-Juveniles and the Death Penalty-A Better Alternative to Killing Our Children:
Youth Empowerment, 22 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 391, 395 (1996)
(mentioning juvenile offenders tried in their own system are adjudicated "delinquent" as
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This emerging model drew from the premise that since a child is
not mentally mature enough to comprehend his or her own ac-
tions, he or she needs the state's protection, not its punish-
ment.35 The juvenile system served to shield children from the
stigma that attaches to criminals within the adult criminal sys-
tem.36 Unlike the adult system, the inherent privacy of the ju-
venile system prevented the public from readily formulating a
negative opinion about the youthful offender. 37 The different
philosophies are further evinced in the statutory language util-
ized by the separate systems.38 The standard crime and punish-
ment language was replaced by the rehabilitative terminology of
opposed to being found "guilty" of crime, and are then placed in state agencies where
treatment is provided until juvenile is deemed ready to return to society); Roger J.R.
Levesque, Future Visions of Juvenile Justice: Lessons from International and Compara-
tive Law, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1563, 1585 n.61 (1996) (describing origins of current ju-
venile court system as derived from ideas of social control and "cultural conceptions of
childhood"); Sabo, supra note 19, at 2429-31 (contending that premise behind juvenile
justice system was to protect children who needed help by focusing on individualized
treatment for rehabilitative purposes as opposed to penalization). But see Tomkins, supra
note 30, at 1622 (stating that early juvenile justice system failed to achieve goal of indi-
vidualized treatment of juvenile offenders, instead operating similarly to adult criminal
system).
35 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
36 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (noting juvenile justice provi-
sions have sought to shield youth from negative publicity); Irene Merker Rosenberg,
Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 WIS. L.
REV. 163, 184-85 (mentioning juvenile courts' many positive aspects as "institutionalized
diversionary system [offering] anonymity, diminished stigma, shorter sentences, and rec-
ognition of rehabilitation as a viable goal"); Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 13, at 178 n.27
(using rehabilitative theory and establishing its own system, juvenile courts rebuffed pit-
falls of criminal proceedings thus avoiding stigma of criminal prosecution); see also T.
Markus Funk, A Mere Youthful Indiscretion? Reexamining the Policy of Expunging Juve-
nile Delinquency Records, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 805, 891 (1996) (asserting stigma of label
of juvenile delinquent may lead to incorrect characterization of reformed individual,
when it may be system which failed to rehabilitate him); Sabo, supra note 19, at 2430
(explaining goal of juvenile court judge was to rehabilitate youthful offenders through
"individualized justice" and focus on welfare of child).
37 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974) (noting confidentiality of juvenile
offender's record is constitutional right); Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy:
A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1012 (1995)
[hereinafter Violent Youth] (accessing juvenile portion of adult offender's criminal past is
impossible due to confidentiality afforded these records).
38 See Rossum, supra note 3, at 912 (explaining specialized vocabulary established by
juvenile courts wherein "petitions of delinquency replaced criminal complaints, hearings
replaced trials, adjudication of delinquency replaced judgments of guilt, and dispositions
replaced sentences"); Tompkins, supra note 30, at 1623 (illustrating vocabulary differ-
ences in juvenile justice system: "social service personnel, probation officers, and clini-
cians" rather than "lawyers, prosecutors, and prison guards" of criminal system); see also
In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125, 1125 (1981) (holding that publication of youth's name could im-
pair rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice system); Robert B. Acton, Gubernatorial Ini-
tiatives and Rhetoric of Juvenile Justice Reform, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 277, 338 n.84 (1996)
(stating "cloak of confidentiality" surrounding juvenile court proceedings functions to
prevent legal and social stigma from following child into adulthood).
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diagnosis and treatment, respectively. 39
C. Current National Trend is Abandoning the Rehabilitative
Purpose of the Juvenile System
The problem with the modern juvenile process may be deeper
than retracting from a rehabilitative goal.40 The trend of
"criminalizing" the juvenile justice system ultimately results in
reverting to the classical view of juvenile justice, resulting in a
blurring of boundaries between juvenile and adult criminal
courts. 41 Despite the change in terminology and altruistic ideals,
current juvenile courts across the nation do not reflect the re-
habilitative intentions of the original system's proponents.
42
39 See Cintron, supra note 32, at 1259 (citations omitted). Juvenile court hearings are
civil proceedings which keep with the rehabilitative and treatment philosophies due, in
part, to (1) juvenile offenders are not deemed "guilty," but "in need of court's help," (2)
offenders are considered "delinquent" as opposed to "criminal," (3) hearings in juvenile
court are not conducted openly, as adult criminal hearings, and (4) proceedings in crimi-
nal court are not adversarial. Id.; Hager, supra note 13, at 822-23. Referring to proceed-
ings against child in juvenile system as "petition in the welfare of the child" rather than
"criminal complaint" in adult system; adults are "arrested" while juveniles are "taken
into custody"; adults have "trials" while juveniles have "adjudication hearings." Id.
40 See Kent, 383 U.S. at 555-56 (criticizing inadequate facilities available in juvenile
justice system along with apathy towards reality that these children fail to receive bene-
fits of either system); Fritsch & Hemens, supra note 6, at 568 (illustrating that liberal
criticism of juvenile justice system is derived from abuse of discretion available in reha-
bilitative model); Levesque, supra note 34, at 1573 (determining that merger of retribu-
tive and rehabilitative goals result in reduction of legal remedies and dilution of rehabili-
tative services).
41 See Transformation, supra note 22, at 691-92 (supporting theory that juvenile and
adult courts have converged both procedurally and substantively); Mills, supra note 22,
at 935 (noting only substantial difference between current juvenile and adult systems of
justice is right to jury trial); see also Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., The Right to a Public Jury
Trial: A Need for Today's Juvenile Court, 76 JUDICATURE 230, 234 (1993) (discussing
criminalization of adjudicatory hearing process along with difficulty distinguishing mod-
ern juvenile system from adult criminal system); David Yellen, What Juvenile Court Abo-
litionists Can Learn from the Failures of Sentencing Reform, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 577, 591
(asserting that convergence of juvenile and adult criminal systems resulted from Su-
preme Court's criminalization of juvenile processes and trend "towards diminishing ju-
venile courts' authority over 'status offenders"'). See generally Leta R. Holden, Juvenile
Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 843, 843 (1996) (attributing ambiguity in juvenile rights arena
to Tenth Circuit's regression in failing to award minors procedural due process protec-
tion).
42 See Giardino, supra note 13, at 224 (stating that common design of juvenile justice
system to rehabilitate no longer exists throughout America's juvenile systems); Sheffer,
supra note 11, at 479 (noting juvenile justice system has become more punitive and less
rehabilitative); Abbe Smith, They Dream of Growing Older: On Kids and Crime, 36 B.C.
L. REV. 953, 956-61 (1995) (explaining nature of crime and punishment in juvenile con-
text; noting that images of juvenile crime spread fear and drive social policy to punish
"bad seed"). But see Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Stories of Child Outlaws: On Child Hedon-
ism and Adult Power in Juvenile Justice, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 495, 495 (noting modern re-
formers value public safety over rehabilitation). See generally Socrates Peter Manoukian,
Distinguishing Starfish from Cobras: The Importance of Discretion for the Juvenile Judge
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Some states, however, have maintained the rehabilitative
framework, 43 while others have integrated punishment and re-
habilitation. 44 There are other states which have completely
abandoned rehabilitation in favor of a purely punitive position.45
This disparate treatment reinforces the need for comparable pro-
cedural safeguards 46 and implicates constitutional due process
in Fitness Hearings, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 805, 808-10 (1996) (discussing purpose of juvenile
courts as one of protection of both juvenile involved and public at large); Steve Turst,
Proposition 102: The Real Focus, 33 ARIZ. ATT'Y 43, 43 (1996) (discussing Arizona's failed
juvenile justice system).
43 See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 119, § 1 (1996) (stating primary purpose of juvenile jus-
tice system is "to direct its efforts, first, to the strengthening and encouragement of fam-
ily life for the protection and care of children ...."); see also FLA. STAT. chs. 39.001-.002
(1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-1 (1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.010 (Banks-Balwin
1990); MINN. STAT. § 260.011 (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-102 (1997); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169-B:1 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2a:4A-21 (West 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE §
27-20-01 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01 (Anderson 1997); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6301 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-20 (Law Co-op. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-
5 (Michie 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-101 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5501
(1997); W. VA. CODE § 49-1-1 (1997); WIS. STAT. § 48.01 (1996).
44 See ALA. CODE § 12-15-1 (1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-302 (Michie 1995); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West 1996); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-102 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-1 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-1 (1993); 705 ILL.
REV. STAT. 405/1-2 (West 1996); IND. CODE § 31-6-1-1.1 (1997); IOWA CODE § 232.1 (1996);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1601 (1995); LA. CODE JUV. PROC. ANN. art. 801 (West 1995); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3002 (West 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-802
(1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.1 (1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-103 (1996); MO.
REV. STAT. § 211.011 (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-102 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
246 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.031 (1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:1 (1995); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-21 (West 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-01 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.01 (Anderson 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 419A.002 (1995); PA. CONS. STAT. §
6301 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-2 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-20 (Law Co-op. 1995);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-6 (Michie 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5501 (1996); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-227 (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE § 49-1-1 (1996).
45 See Joseph F. Yeckel, Violent Juvenile Offenders: Rethinking Federal Intervention
in Juvenile Justice, 51 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 331, 354-56 (1997) (reporting
increases in violent juvenile crime rate has been impetus for more transfers to criminal
court); see also Fox Butterfeld, Indiana Transfers Teen Girl from Adult Prison, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, July 10, 1997, at A15 (noting considerations by Congress to provide grants
for states which would increase ability to adjudicate more juveniles in adult system);
Bradette Jespsen, This New Breed of Juvenile Offenders, CORRECTIONS TODAY, July 1,
1997, at 68 (stating between 1992 and 1995, 48 states have passed legislation enabling
them to prosecute more juveniles in adult criminal court, resulting in increase in number
of juveniles incarcerated in adult prisons).
46 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966). In Kent, the Supreme Court
held that a juvenile being transferred to adult criminal court is entitled to a hearing
prior to the entry of an order of waiver. Id. Failure to provide such a hearing, the Court
continued, is tantamount to denial of effective counsel. Id. Such hearing, though not re-
quired to meet the rigid formalities of a trial or administrative hearing, must meet the
"essentials of due process and fair treatment." Id. at 562 (quoting Pee v. United States,
274 F.2d 556, 559 (1959)); Rosenberg, supra note 36, at 163. Juvenile courts fail to give
minor offenders constitutional and procedural rights guaranteed to adults. Id. at 165-66;
see also Michelle I. Baird & Mina B. Samuels, Justice for Youth: The Betrayal of Child-
hood in the United States, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 177, 189-90 (1996). This article notes that prior
to the Supreme Court's landmark decisions of In re Gault and Kent v. United States,
children were "neither considered 'citizens' nor entitled to all the rights contained in the
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considerations that were prevalent during the 1960's and the en-
suing decades. 47
II. SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDERS-TODAY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM'S GOALS FOR DEALING WITH
SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDERS
A. The Impact of Public Perceptions on Juvenile Justice
Legislation
The shocking nature of violent crimes committed by youths
today48 significantly departs from the severity of youth crimes in
the past.49 Furthermore, sensationalized media coverage of
teenage crimes affects public perceptions 50 and political re-
U.S. Constitution." Id.; William T. Stetzer, The Worst of Both Worlds: How the Kansas
Sentencing Guidelines Have Abandoned Juveniles in the Name of "Justice" 35
WASHBURN L.J. 308, 309-10 (1996). Until the late 1960's, juveniles were not afforded the
same constitutional protections as adult defendants, including: the right to counsel, the
right against self-incrimination, and the right to appeal. Id. The result of this arbitrary
approach was "unfettered discretion." Id. at 310.
47 See Kent, 383 U.S. at 543. This case marked the courts initial recognition of due
process violations with respect to juveniles and subjected the system to its first positive
transition. Id. The Supreme Court held that juveniles were entitled to a hearing prior to
being transferred to adult systems. Id. This hearing was to "measure up to the essentials
of due process and fair treatment." Id. at 556. Such measures required a recorded hear-
ing with the presence and participation of counsel. Id. at 561; see also In re Bault, 387
U.S. 1, 27-29 (1967). The rights announced in Kent were expanded when the court af-
forded the following constitutional rights to these juvenile offenders: the right to counsel,
the right to receive notice of charges, the right against self-incrimination, the right to
appellate review, the right to transcripts of proceedings, the right of confrontation, and
the right to cross-examination of witnesses. Id. at 27-60. Initially the juvenile court em-
ployed the lower standard of proof used in civil trials, however, the Court in In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), increased the burden of proof for delinquents to "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt". Id. at 360-61. The alteration of form and function was further enhanced
by the holding in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), which extended the Fifth Amend-
ment right of Double Jeopardy to prevent the adult re-prosecution of a juvenile previ-
ously convicted of the same charges in juvenile court. Id. at 529-31.
48 See Angie Chuang, A Sad Crusade Crime, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at B1
(empathizing with anguish of family whose sixty-two year old father was murdered by
teenage carjacker); Glen Martin, Youth Sentenced in Girl's Horrific Slaying, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 8, 1997, at A15 (reporting satanic torture, rape, and murder of fifteen year old girl
by three teenage girls); Two Charged in Death of Baby Go Home, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1997, at A10 (reporting murder of newborn son by two teenagers who delivered child and
then dumped body in motel trash bin).
49 See Yeckel, supra note 45, at 332-33 (commenting on less severe nature of juvenile
crimes in nineteenth century as opposed to numerous weapons involved and shocking
nature of crimes committed by today's youth).
50 See Martin v. Strassburg, Justice for Juveniles? The Second Circuit Declares Ju-
venile Preventive Detention Statute Unconstitutional, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 517, 519 (1984).
Public fear of uncontrolled criminal activity has let out a pervasive cry for state action
and punitive sentencing. Id. High profile cases have fueled public outrage and spurred
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sponses. 51 The public is inundated with official reports depicting
senseless youth crimes. 52 Violent crimes by teenagers have re-
cently included parental murders, 53 school yard killings, 54 and
gang rapes. 55 Increasing public fear of victimization in light of
debate on juvenile justice. Id.; see also Patricia Edmonds and Sam V. Meddis, Crime and
Punishment: Is the Juvenile Justice System 'Creating Monsters?, USA TODAY, Sept. 28,
1994, at 1A. There is little disagreement that the American public's concern with crime
and personal safety has driven political discourse most recently manifesting itself in the
Clinton Administration Crime Bill. Id.; Arlene Levinson, Public Perception of Soaring
Crime Skewed, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1994, at A9. The public's perception and fear of
growing violence gives legislative proposals such as "three strikes you're out" much veloc-
ity. Id.; Laura Mansnerus, Treating Teenagers as Adults: A Trend Born of Revulsion,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1993, at B7. In direct response to public concerns with brutal juvenile
crimes, in 1993 nine states enacted legislation that increased the likelihood that youths
would be prosecuted in criminals courts. Id. But see Murders Across Nation Rise by Three
Percent, But Overall Violent Crime is Down, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1994, at A13. The FBI's
Uniform Crime Report found that although the statistics reflect an increase in the mur-
der rate, the number of violent crimes has decreased. Id.
51 See generally Beatty, supra note 4, at 979 (critiquing legislative reactions as re-
sponse to public outrage at juvenile crime); Kane, supra note 19, at 927 (recognizing vio-
lent crime epidemic as prevalent factor in public policy debate).
52 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE
UNITED STATES: 1991 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS]. In 1990, the
nation experienced its highest juvenile violent crime arrest rate, 430 per 100,000 juve-
niles. Id. at 1. The 1990 rate was 27% higher than the 1980 rate. Id. Between 1988 and
1992, the number of violent Crime Index Arrest of juveniles increased by 47%-more
than twice the increase for persons 18 years of age or older. Id. Most alarmingly, juvenile
arrests for murder increased by 51%, compared to the percentage for adults. Id. In 1980,juveniles accounted for just 10% of all arrests for homicide. Id. By 1990, juveniles ac-
counted for 13.6% of all homicide arrests. Id. Between 1984 and 1992, the number of ju-
veniles arrested for homicide, who were under the age of fifteen, increased by 50%. Id.
Local law enforcement agencies transmit data to state agencies and the FBI based on
reports from victims of crimes or investigations. Id. at 1-3. The FBI's Serious Crime In-
dex includes both violent and property crimes providing the most widely cited measure of
trends in offenses. Id. at 1. The Crime Index records four violent crimes: burglary, lar-
ceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Id. Typically, both reported crimes and arrests
are standardized as rates per 100,000 persons to control for changes in population com-
position. Id. But see Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implications of
a Well-Known Secret, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 868-875 (1981). These arrests
rates may somewhat overstate juveniles' violent criminal involvement because youths,
more than adults, tend to commit crimes in groups and one criminal event may produce
several juvenile arrests. Id.
53 See Andrew Buchanan, Teen to Be Tried as Adult in Shooting of Mom, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 28, 1997, at 1 (buying gun on street, fifteen year-old shot stepmother on Christmas
night during family argument); Lawrence Hammack, Options Limited When Suspect is
Eight, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Jan. 16, 1997, at Al (discussing possibility of
eight year old being charged with murder of stepfather); David Somer, Teen Gets 17-Year
Prison Term, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 14, 1997, at 1 (reporting sixteen year old boy found
guilty of second degree murder for stabbing his stepfather to death with steak knife);
Teen Who Murdered Parents, Two Others, Given Life Term, VANCOUVER SUN, Jan. 21,
1997, at B3 (shooting his parents because they nagged him about using marijuana, six-
teen year old boy pled guilty to murder).
54 See Kellie Patrick, Tired of Running, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 29, 1997, at 1A
(charging fourteen year-old with murder after shooting classmate in schoolyard over
wrist watch).
55 See David R. Anderson & Romel Hernandez, Four Teen Boys Face Charges of Rap-
ing Girl, 15, at Umatilla, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 31, 1997, at E3 (reporting gang
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such reported crimes is also prompted by expanding caseloads in
juvenile courts and the inability of the juvenile justice system to
respond adequately to this "new breed" of youthful offenders.
56
As a result of these disturbing statistics, 57 critics of the cur-
rent juvenile system advocate the prosecution of more youths in
the adult system in order to serve the interests of the commu-
nity.58 Public concern over the inability of juvenile courts to ef-
fectuate the rehabilitation of chronic youthful offenders, com-
bined with the goal of public safety, accompany the growing fear
of youth crime. 59 This fear has prompted legislators to craft
statutes which serve both to protect the community and to re-
habilitate the young offender. 60 This Note suggests, however,
that the practical effect of such legislation really favors the
community's interest rather than those of the child.
B. The Paradox Between the Purpose Clause and the Statutory
Scheme
Most states' juvenile court statutes contain a "purpose
clause"6 1 or preamble, explaining the underlying rationale be-
hind the legislation. 62 Statutory purpose clauses regarding the
rape of fifteen year old classmate in high school's baseball dugout); Jacquie Paul, Hearing
to Decide Teen's Trial Status, PRESS ENTERPRISE, Mar. 1, 1997, at B1 (awaiting determi-
nation of whether sixteen year old involved in gang rape will be prosecuted as adult).
56 See Barry C. Feld, Justice By Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations
in Juvenile Justice Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 166-69 (1991)
[hereinafter Justice By Geography] (analyzing number of structural features that affect
juvenile justice administration); see also Robert J. Simpson & John H. Laub, Structural
Variations in Juvenile Court Processing: Inequality, the Underclass, and Social Control,
28 L. & SOC'Y REV. 285, 305 (1993) (contending minority youths involved in violent
crimes feed public anxiety about emergence of structural "underclass").
57 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
58 See Strassburg, supra note 50, at 521 (explaining how public has demanded
harsher, longer sentences for young offenders convicted of violent crimes).
59 See Ira M. Schwartz et al., Public Attitudes Toward Juvenile Crime and Juvenile
Justice: Implications for Public Policy, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 241, 242-44 (1992).
The author described national survey results concerning attitude towards juvenile crime.
Id. The survey indicated that punitive attitudes towards juvenile offenders are signifi-
cantly related to the fear of being victimized by a violent crime. Id. at 241.
60 See Kimberly A. Tolhurst, A Search for Solutions: Evaluating the Latest Anti-
Stalking Developments and the National Institute of Justice Model Stalking Code, 1 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 269, 272 (1994) (growing public outcry and occurrences such as
murder of actress Rebecca Schaffer caused California to enact first anti-stalking law).
61 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1175 (6th ed. 1990). A purpose clause is useful in
aiding courts interpret statutory ambiguities in line with legislative purpose. Id. A statu-
tory preamble is an explanatory declaration made by the enacting body presenting the
reasoning and objectives of a particular statute. Id.
62 See Giardino, supra note 13, at 227-30. Some jurisdictions have ceased including
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treatment of juveniles are intended to guide courts and other in-
tervening institutions dealing with young criminals.63 The main
purpose for the creation of the juvenile court was to serve as a
"Rehabilitative Ideal,"64 promoting criminal deterrence 65 rather
than punishment. 66 Therefore, when examining the purpose
clause of the Family Court Act, rehabilitative goals should be
enumerated within it and furthered by the statutory framework.
Upon examining the applicable purpose clauses in tandem with
New York's statutory scheme affecting serious youth offenders,
the inconsistencies between the two are revealed. 67
Originally New York's Children's Court Act 68 did not enumer-
ate a purpose per se.69 The policy of differentiating children from
purpose clauses in their juvenile justice laws. Id. For those that continue to use them,
these statutory goals should be seen merely as guidelines as opposed to authoritative or
binding directives. Id.
63 See Principle of Offense, supra note 8, at 847. Despite the statutory purpose
clause, the true purpose of juvenile court statutes may be found within the sentencing
framework of the statute itself. Id.
64 See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 26 (1964)
(presenting rehabilitative ideal as illusive of true definition); see also Francis A. Allen,
The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal in American Criminal Justice, 27 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 147, 151-53 (1978) (noting rehabilitative ideal requires belief that humans possess
possibility to change in direction that is morally agreeable to reasonable person); Cin-
tron, supra note 32, at 1260 (noting rehabilitation focuses on present and future well-
being of person while punishment looks to deter individual via deprivation of liberty);
Violent Youth, supra note 37, at 971 (indicating juvenile court provided rehabilitative al-
ternative to adult criminal system); Harshbarger & Keshian, supra note 33, at 136
(noting rehabilitative ideal focused on combination of policies of jurisprudence and social
welfare); Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 375,
377 (transforming juveniles into law-abiding citizens through rehabilitation was process
designed to begin in court and proceed through confinement).
65 See Cintron, supra note 32, at 1258 (contending criminal deterrence is achieved in
juvenile courts by addressing family issues, thus preparing him to function in our struc-
tured society); see also Dr. Malcolm W. Klein, Framing the Juvenile Justice Problem: The
Reality Behind the Problem, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 860, 866-67 (1996) (warning "deterrence
theory" requires acknowledgment of "deterrence reality" wherein police, courts, probation
and parole officers must be regarded as credible sanctioners). See generally Sheffer, su-
pra note 11, at 482-90 (discussing dual goals of juvenile justice system of rehabilitation
and punishment).
66 See Violent Youth, supra note 37, at 970 (allowing judges to exercise enormous dis-
cretion to implement scientific and preventative goals of juvenile system).
67 See N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 301.1 (Gould 1997). The purpose of juvenile proceedings in
the New York Family Court is to "consider the needs and best interests of the [juvenile] as
well as the need for protection of the community." Id.
68 See Gordon A. Martin Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a
Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 57, 61-62 (1992). Prior to 1978 New York did
not have any provisions for the transfer of youths to adult court. Id.
69 See Transformation, supra note 22, at 715. Held while there was no specific pur-
pose enumerated in the original court act, the juvenile court system was originally in-
tended to be a social welfare system. Id. It was intended to identify needs and point the
child or the family to the appropriate service. Id. The system was not designed to handle
the serious criminal matters now coming before it. Id. See generally Merril Sobie, Prac-
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adults in specialized programs began as early as 1824 when New
York established the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile De-
linquents in the City of New York. 70 The Society's charter per-
mitted courts to place convicted children below the age of sixteen
in state facilities such as the House of Refuge. 71 The goal was to
reform and care for these youths who otherwise would be help-
less. 72 Pursuant to the benevolent approach of the Society, addi-
tional specialized programs were developed to "help" delinquents
in 1840. 73 These new programs further extended the ability of
the courts to place juveniles in prevention programs rather than
incarceration. 74
In 1902, the "Children's Court"75 was established in Manhat-
tan.76 The title, however, was a misnomer 77 since jurisdiction
tice Commentary, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (Gould 1997). This commentary sets forth a
history of the purpose of the New York juvenile justice system. Id.
70 See HOWER FOLKS, THE CARE OF DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED, AND DELINQUENT
CHILDREN 172 (1900). Homer notes that other societies in New York State were founded
at or around the same time: the Rochester Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Chil-
dren (SPCC) was founded in 1875; societies in Richmond County and Brooklyn were
founded in 1880. Id.; BROOKLYN SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN,
ANNUAL REPORT 49 (1897). The Brooklyn SPCC also operated in Queens and Long Is-
land. Id.; YONKERS SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, ANNUAL
REPORT 10 (1882). The Yonkers society was founded in 1882. Id. See generally Transfor-
mation, supra note 22, at 701. The traditional distinction between the juvenile justice
system and the adult criminal justice system is that the former emphasizes the rehabili-
tation of offenders, whereas the latter emphasizes the deterrence, punishment and social
control of offenders. Id.
71 See Elbridge T. Gerry, The Relations of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children to Child-Saving Work, in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 196 (Robert Bremner ed., 1971); Patricia Clement, The City and the Child,
1860-1885, in AMERICAN CHILDHOOD 235, 263 (Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds.,
1985).
72 See generally In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-500210, 864 P.2d 560,
562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (stating "the purpose of sentencing schemes for juveniles is re-
habilitation, whereas the purpose for adults is punishment"); State ex rel. Romley v. Su-
perior Court, 823 P.2d 1347, 1351-52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (deferring to juvenile court's
finding that it is in public's best interest that defendant be rehabilitated in juvenile jus-
tice system).
73 See LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS & HISTORY OF
FAMILY VIOLENCE 28 (1988). The author details the historical underpinnings of the Soci-
ety for Reformation. Id.; see also Folks, supra note 70, at 174. Institutions including the
Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents, American Female Guardian Society,
New York Juvenile Asylum, Home for Christian Care, New York Catholic Protectory,
and Hebrew Benevolent Society were all involved in helping delinquent youths. Id.
74 See, e.g., 1863 N.Y. LAWS ch. 448 § 8.
75 See Kane, supra note 19, at 945 (noting NYJOL has removed from family court's
original jurisdiction, children between ages of thirteen and fifteen who have been
charged with designated felony).
76 See A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 54 (1969)
(tracking historical development of juvenile court in New York).
77 See id. at 81 (noting original elements of juvenile court system in New York); see
also ELIJAH DEVOE, THE REFUGE SYSTEM, OR PRISON DISCIPLINE APPLIED TO JUVENILE
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over children remained with the criminal tribunal. 78 In fact, the
Act which created this "Children's Court" merely transferred de-
linquency cases and other matters involving children to a sepa-
rate part within the adult criminal system. 79 By 1910, most ur-
ban centers and counties in New York had sectioned off a part of
their courts to handle juvenile delinquents.
New York did not complete the passage of a separate system to
meet the needs of the child until 1922 when an independent
children's court was created.80 Eventually, however, the New
York City Children's Court was merged into the City Domestic
Relations Court,8 ' with the former losing its distinct character.8 2
The provisions of the 1922 Act did not enumerate the purpose for
the creation of this separate court which resulted in further
compression of the goals of both courts.8 3
The 1962 Family Court Act 84 stipulated that its purpose was
"to provide due process of law ... for considering juvenile delin-
quency... and devising an appropriate disposition for these
youths."85 This legislation also failed to spell out a particular
purpose, yet it implied that the welfare of the juvenile was a
DELINQUENTS 27-28 (1848) (noting original juvenile system was combination of elements
of reform and retribution).
78 See Katz & Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction, The Vagueness Doctrine, and the Rule
of Law, in BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT 201 (L. Teitel-
baum & A. Gough eds., 1977). The authors note that Juvenile Court jurisdiction typically
reached both conduct that was wrongful for adults and behavior that was wrongful only
for minors such as truancy and running away from home. Id. Moreover, most delin-
quency statutes included broad residual categories for children who had not committed a
particular act of misconduct but nonetheless seemed to require judicial supervision. Id.
On the breadth of juvenile court statutes and the reasons for it, the authors comment
that the Juvenile Court shared in overlapping powers with its adult counterpart. Id.
79 See supra note 78 and accompanying text; see also Cadwallader D. Colden & Peter
A. Jay, The Condition of Children in the Penitentiary and Bridewell, New York, 1819, in
10 MINUTES OF THE COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1784-1831 467-68
(detailing legislatively implemented procedure to transfer youth offenders to adult crimi-
nal court).
80 See J. DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 47-53 (R. Bremner ed., 1971); Van Wa-
ters, The Juvenile Court from the Child's Viewpoint, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE
COURT 217, 218-19 (J. Addams ed., 1925).
81 See Kane, supra note 19, at 45 (detailing merger of Children Court and Domestic
Relation Court); see also Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspec-
tive, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1189-90 (1990) (describing that complete evolution of sepa-
rate system was not implemented in New York until 1922).
82 See Fox, supra note 82, at 1194; Transformation, supra note 22, at 724; see also
CLARENCE DARROW, CRIME: ITS CAUSE & TREATMENT 47 (1922).
83 See Fox, supra note 82, at 1190-96. But see Merril Sobie, Practice Commentary,
N.Y Family Court Act § 301.1 (1987) (noting that delinquency procedure and disposition
provisions of Children Court Act were largely unamended).
84 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
85 1962 FAM. CT. ACT., 1962 N.Y. Laws, ch. 686, § 756.
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driving factor.8 6
Eventually, in 1976 the Juvenile Justice Reform Act set forth
the following dual purpose: "In any juvenile delinquency proceed-
ing under this article, the court shall consider the needs and best
interests of the respondent as well as the need for protection of
the community."8 7 The first purpose reflected the historical em-
phasis on the best interests of the individual child as set up by
New York's juvenile system in 1824.88 In contrast, the latter
clause represents the more modern concern over the commu-
nity's interests. 89 Since juvenile justice systems across the na-
tion address competing interests, 90 a state may often forego one
in order to achieve the other. 91 In light of this, New York's Ju-
venile Offender Law is capable of being read as protecting the
community over the best interest of the child and furthers the
purpose set forth in the Family Court Act.
92
86 Case law during this period reveals that the best interest of the delinquent was a
priority for the judiciary. See In re Kevin G., 159 Misc. 2d 288, 295, 604 N.Y.S.2d 669,
673 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993) (noting purpose of juvenile justice system is rehabilitative); In
re Steven E.H., 124 Misc. 2d 385, 388, 477 N.Y.S.2d 563, 565 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984)
(stating essential purpose of family court was rehabilitative, even though court is man-
dated to consider both needs of juvenile and protection of community); In re Coleman,
117 Misc. 2d 1061, 1065, 459 N.Y.S.2d 711, 714 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983) (noting that pri-
mary intent behind juvenile justice proceedings is rehabilitative); People v. Young, 99
Misc. 2d 328, 330, 416 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979) (noting rehabilitation of
child is court's first consideration).
87 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1997).
88 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
89 See Sobie, supra note 84, at 685.
90 See generally Sheffer, supra note 11, at 482-90 (discussing dual goals of juvenile
justice system of rehabilitation and punishment as method of deterrence).
91 See Giardino, supra note 13, at 225 (stating "while every state may wish to ideally
reconcile all competing interests, each is ultimately 'forced to make choices regarding the
emphasis and preference to attach to each value' and arrive at a 'balance that reflects
[each] legislature's sense of social priorities').
92 See People v. Mason, 416 N.Y.S.2d 981, 983 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (finding legisla-
tion that essentially made 13, 14 and 15 year-olds criminally responsible for certain
enumerated felonies non-violative of Equal Protection Clause because it was rationally
related to legislative goal of promoting public safety); see also Matter of Elizabeth J., 413
N.Y.S.2d 867, 868 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979) (holding purpose clause is new factor to be
weighed at dispositional hearings which gives due consideration for protection of com-
munity). But see People v. Young, 416 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1979) (noting
purpose clause of Juvenile Justice Reform Act did not change rehabilitative goals of ju-
venile court but merely gave second factor to consider after "the needs and best interests
of the respondent").
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III. NEW YORK'S PURPOSE CLAUSE IS NOT SERVED BY THE
STATUTORY SCHEME REGARDING SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS
A. New York's Juvenile Offender Law and '7Reverse Waiver"
Process
Consistent with the current trend to keep serious juvenile of-
fenders from hiding behind the protections of the juvenile
court,93 New York adheres to a policy of trying these youths in
adult criminal courts. 94 The distinction between juvenile versus
criminal adjudication is drawn on the basis of age and the sever-
ity of the crime, with the statute identifying these adolescents as
"juvenile offenders."95 Under the New York JOL, juveniles ages
thirteen through fifteen 96 are eligible for criminal court adjudi-
93 See Mabel Artegea, Juvenile Justice with a Future for Juveniles, 2 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 215, 238 (1995) (noting juveniles eligible for criminal court adjudication
include those aged thirteen to fifteen who have been charged with offenses for which they
may be held criminally responsible); Reform Proposals to Arizona's Juvenile Justice Sys-
tem, 32 Feb. ARIZ. ATT'Y 35, 35 (1996) (proposing to overhaul Arizona's juvenile justice
system by imposing "dual sentencing" procedure which would allow court to sentence ju-
venile offender as adult, as juvenile, or both); see also Susan K. Knipps, What Is a "Fair"
Response to Juvenile Crime?, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 455, 458 (1993) (noting Juvenile Of-
fender Law of 1978 was response to public outcry over perceived increase in violent ju-
venile crime). But see Strasburg, supra note 50, at 563 (noting public outcry has forced
state governments to refocus traditional juvenile justice goals of rehabilitation and pre-
vention to favor those of crime control and punishment).
94 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1987) (stating person thirteen, four-
teen, or fifteen years old is criminally responsible for acts constituting murder in second
degree, person fourteen or fifteen is criminally responsible for kidnapping in first degree,
arson in first degree, assault in first degree, manslaughter in first degree, rape in first
degree, sodomy in first degree, aggravated sexual abuse, burglary in first degree, arson
in second degree, robbery in first and second degree); see also Kane, supra note 19, at 927
(recognizing NYJOL to be "the most punitive and regressive in America"); John P.
Woods, New York's Juvenile Offender Law: An Overview and Analysis, 9 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1, 1-2 (1980) (noting that NYJOL indicates trend to abandon existing legal measures
that protect juvenile offenders by observing that scheme is "one of the harshest juvenilejustice [sentencing] systems in the country"); cf. Franciszka A. Monarski, Note, Rehabili-
tation vs. Punishment: A Comparative Analysis of the Juvenile Justice Systems in Massa-
chusetts and New York, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1091, 1093 (1987) (comparing Massachu-
setts's legislative approach to prosecuting juveniles as adults with New York's recently
overhauled punitive system). See generally Knipps, supra note 94, at 455 (noting New
York's approach to juvenile crime is too punitive because it is based upon adult criminal
system).
95 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(18) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1995) (providing defini-
tion of juvenile offender based on age and severity of offense). But see N.Y. PENAL LAW §
30.00 (1) (McKinney 1987) (providing that jurisdiction over youthful offenders rests with
family court when age and severity of offense criteria have not been met).
96 See People v. Smith, 635 N.Y.S.2d 824, 829 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1995) (denying
removal of case involving thirteen year old murderer to Family Court due to severity of
offense); People v. Mote, 432 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1001-02 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980) (denying
authorization to remove fifteen year old charged with second degree burglary to juvenile
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cation for serious crimes including murder, kidnapping, arson,
and rape. 97 Thus, the New York JOL enables criminal courts to
exercise original jurisdiction over youths committing these
acts. 98 Prior to the enactment of the New York JOL,99 the Fam-
ily Court generally handled all juveniles, regardless of the of-
fense, from arrest through intake, adjudication, disposition, and
aftercare. 100
The statutory scheme of the New York JOL was given effect
through CPL § 725.00.101 This procedure created a "reverse
waiver," 102 permitting juvenile offenders proceedings to be re-
moved to Family Court at the discretion of the prosecutor and
criminal court. 103 Invocation of reverse waiver 104 specifically
court); People v. Lugo, 414 N.Y.S.2d 243, 252 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1979) (excluding fifteen
year old charged with robbery in second degree from juvenile court jurisdiction).
97 See Smith, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 829. The New York Appellate Division, denied removal
of a thirteen-year old accused of murder because the offense was grave enough for the
child to be punished under the penal law. Id. The minor subsequently was sentenced to
the maximum term of nine years to life. Id.; see also Kane, supra note 19, at 936-41. The
juvenile justice system in New York seems highly punitive because it allows children as
young as thirteen years of age to be tried and sentenced as an adult for certain felonies.
Id. But see N Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 510.15 (Gould 1997). The statute requires that "no
principal under the age of sixteen... shall be detained in any prison, jail, lockup ...
used for adults convicted of a crime.. . without the approval of the state division for
youth." Id. New York attempts to mitigate the potential dangers associated with confin-
ing children in penitentiaries by separating them from adult offenders. Id.
98 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(18) (McKinney 1991) (allowing for original jurisdic-
tion over juveniles for certain offenses); see also Arteaga, supra note 94, at 239 (noting
that being tried as a "juvenile offender" in criminal court means facing indeterminate
sentence of incarceration if convicted); Kane, supra note 19, at 927-29 (stating that New
York has most punitive juvenile law in country because it allows children as young as
thirteen to be tried and sentenced as an adult for certain crimes). But see N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 10.15 (McKinney 1997) (stating that person under sixteen cannot be de-
tained in any sort of prison used for adults without approval from state division of
youth).
99 See JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1976, Chapter 878 of the Laws of 1976.
Prior to the Juvenile Offender Law of 1978, the legislature passed the Juvenile Justice
Reform Act of 1976, more commonly known as the Designated Felony Act. Id. Although
adjudication was still handled in the Family Court, the law created a new category of
designated felonies which carried stricter penalties for fourteen and fifteen year-olds ad-
judicated delinquent. Id.
100 See Mills, supra note 22, at 913 (summarizing standard procedure of juvenile pro-
ceedings in Family Court).
101 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 725.00-.20 (McKinney 1997) (allowing New York
Supreme Court to institute removal proceeding pursuant to Article 3 of Family Court
Act).
102 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 180.75(4), 210.43(1)(b) & 2(a)-(i) (McKinney 1997).
The decision to remove the juvenile to Family Court involves the consideration of the
following mitigating factors relating to the individual: The seriousness and circum-
stances of the offense, the extent of the harm caused, the amount of evidence establish-
ing guilt (whether admissible or not), any mitigating circumstances, the defendant's role
in the perpetration of the crime, and the possible deficiencies in proof of the crime. Id.
103 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 180.75(4), 210.43(1)(b) & 2(a)-(i) (McKinney 1997).
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considers social policy factors, such as the impact removal would
have on the welfare and safety of the community, 10 5 its impact
on public confidence in the criminal justice system, 10 6 and any
other factors indicating that a criminal conviction would serve no
useful purpose. 107 Unless these youths are removed to Family
Court, 108 they are tried in the adult court and face criminal
sanctions paralleling those of their adult counterparts. 10 9 New
York provides, however, for the criminal court to alternatively
grant "youthful offender" 110 status within the adult system, al-
lowing the court to impose decreased sanctions including proba-
tion or fines. 111
The Family Court Act gives the New York Supreme Court con-
current jurisdiction. 112 As a practical matter, however, the Fam-
ily Court is deemed to have original jurisdiction over all youthful
offenders since the Supreme Court rarely accepts jurisdiction.
The NYJOL effectively supplanted the discretion of juvenile
104 But see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 180.75(4), 210.43(1)(b) & 2(a)-(i) (McKinney
1997). It should be noted, however, that the family court can never attain jurisdiction of a
criminal offender over the age of sixteen. Id.; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §190.71(c)(1)
(McKinney 1997). The statute notes that some acts performed by individuals over the age
of sixteen are criminal acts. Id. but see also People v. Hana, 504 N.W.2d 166, 182 (Mich.
1993) (Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting). The Supreme Court characterized certification of ju-
veniles to adult court as "the worst punishment the juvenile system is empowered to in-
flict." Id.; Sheffer, supra note 11, at 482. Sheffer explains that "pure" rehabilitation theo-
rists hold that the proper response to juvenile crime is not punishment, but rather
treatment services designed to help children learn to cope with negative external influ-
ences in non-delinquent ways. Id.
105 See People v. Mason, 416 N.Y.S.2d 981, 984 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (holding that
promoting public safety and deterring crime was legitimate legislative goal, thus any dis-
crepancies in treatment of youthful offenders did not rise to level of equal protection vio-
lation).
106 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
107 See Cintron, supra note 32, at 1255. Cintron indicates that the practice of sending
juvenile offenders to adult criminal court often serves as cosmetic crime control. Id.
108 See Giardino, supra note 13, at 270-71 (reporting that referrals to family court
are rare occurrences).
109 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.10 (McKinney 1997) (outlining reference for imprison-
ment of juvenile offender); see also id. at § 70.05 (setting forth prison sentences for ju-
venile offenders). But see Arteaga, supra note 94, at 236 (discussing various options
available to juvenile sex offenders including treatment, becoming ward of court and par-
ticipation in juvenile sexual offender program). But see also Kane, supra note 19, at 927
(noting NYJOL established minimum sentences to secure confinement of juvenile offend-
ers). See generally United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 295 (1992) (dealing with maxi-
mum sentence of juvenile delinquents for conviction as adult).
110 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.10 (McKinney 1997).
111 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.05 (McKinney 1997).
112 See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 8, at 345. The New York Juvenile Offender
Law provided that the criminal court is to have original jurisdiction with regard to speci-
fied serious offenses. Id.
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court judges by removing transfer decisions for serious juvenile
offenders, thus eliminating the pragmatic control previously ex-
ercised by the Family Court.113 In fact, the NYJOL automati-
cally excludes juvenile participants accused of serious crimes
from Family Court jurisdiction and automatically places them in
the adult system. 114 This is done with no evaluation of whether
young offenders would be amenable to treatment. 115 The legisla-
tive scheme of New York presents a philosophical problem by
blurring the boundaries of the juvenile justice court. 116 In fact,
the legislative scheme has completely ignored the underlying ra-
tionale, 117 that adolescents are mentally and emotionally inferior
as compared to most adults, 118 which would otherwise be the
basis for the existence of a separate court. 119 New York's reli-
ance on the foregoing scheme implies that its juvenile system
has failed' 20 and that the adult criminal courts, although prem-
113 See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 8, at 345-47. The legislation also established a
presumptive length of stay in secure confinement, which in some cases differ from those
authorized for adults convicted of similar offenses. Id.
114 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.00(2), 60.10, 70.05 (McKinney 1997) (enumerating
Family Court's limited power).
115 See Lisa Greer, Dealing With the Problem: Discretion Within the Court System, 23
PEPP. L. REV. 886, 888 (1996). Various questions need to be addressed before sending a
child "up to" adult courts. Id.
116 P. PIERSMA ET AL., LAW AND TACTICS IN JUVENILE CASES 13 (1977). The current
New York scheme presents a philosophical problem between the original doctrine ofpar-
ens patrea and the current push for "just desserts" for youth. Id.; A. VON HIRSCH, DOING
JUSTICE 62 (1976). Author notes that the practice of sentencing juveniles to long prison
terms fails to conform to the parens patriae doctrine. Id.
117 See generally Sobie, supra note 84, at 4 (setting forth historical purpose of New
York's juvenile justice system).
118 See JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 108 (1965) (describing
theory of moral development for children through various stages up to adolescence); cf.
Robert Batey, The Rights of Adolescents, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363, 364-69 (1982)
(concluding that for most part adolescents develop intellectually and emotionally at
slower rate than adults).
119 See In re Kevin G., 159 Misc. 2d 288, 294, 604 N.Y.S.2d 669, 673 (N.Y. Fain. Ct.
1993) (noting purpose of juvenile justice system is rehabilitative, taking into account
child's interests); In re Steven E.H., 117 Misc. 2d 952, 954, 459 N.Y.S.2d 563, 565 (Civ.
Ct. 1983) (stating essential purpose of Family Court is rehabilitative, even though court
must consider needs of both juvenile and protection of community); In re Coleman, 117
Misc. 2d 1061, 459 N.Y.S.2d 711, 714 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1983) (noting primary goal of juve-
nile justice proceedings is rehabilitative); see also People v. Young, 99 Misc. 2d 1061,
1063 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1979) (noting what is best for child is still first primary considera-
tion).
120 See MICHAEL A. JONES & BARRY KRISBERG, IMAGES AND REALITY: JUVENILE
CRIME, YOUTH VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 31-32 (1994). Most Americans believe that
enrolling juvenile offenders in treatment programs is a better deterrent than sending
them to adult prison. Id. at 35. In 1991, polls indicated that sending juvenile offenders to
training school discourages other young people from committing crimes. Id.; Transforma-
tion, supra note 22, at 708. Feld notes that statutory schemes similar to New York's,
which emphasizes retribution, remove judicial sentencing discretion. Id.
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ised on a purely myopic punishment policy, are nevertheless bet-
ter able to accommodate juvenile offenders. 121
B. Best Interests of the Child and Protection of the Community
Are Not Mutually Exclusive Goals
As a matter of law, juvenile offenders who commit serious
crimes in New York are sometimes denied the protection of the
juvenile court.122 Juvenile court judges rarely scrutinize serious
youth offenders to determine whether punitive, rather than re-
habilitative, methods best serve the dual goals of the child and
the community. 123 The removal of this discretion results in a hi-
erarchy where the interests of the youthful offender are inferior
to those of society.124
As one jurist has noted:
There is no denying the fact that we cannot write these chil-
dren [i.e., serious youth offenders] off forever. Some day
they will grow up and at some point they will have to be
freed from incarceration... and the kind of society we have
in the years to come will in no small measure depend upon
our treatment of them now. 125
121 See Simon I. Singer & David McDowall, Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deter-
rent Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV. 521, 522 (1988)
(noting punitive sanctions embodied in NYJOL).
122 See Giardino, supra note 13, at 268 (detailing factors court should use in deter-
mining whether youth should be tried as adult or juvenile). See generally Violent Youth,
supra note 37, at 1007 (stressing fundamental importance of determining if youth is
"amenable to treat" or "dangerous" in deciding whether youth is adjudicated in adult or
juvenile system).
123 See David C. Howard et al., Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 203, 204 (1977) (discussing how "rehabilitative treatment of prob-
lem children contemplated by juvenile court acts is intended to serve the welfare of both
the child and society").
124 See Kane, supra note 19, at 942. The author emphasizes the importance of broad
judicial discretion in the dispositional decision making process. Id. Kane states that this
power is essential in order to put forth the rehabilitative and individualized treatment
goals of the juvenile system. Id. Kane further stresses that "only after considering the
individual characteristics and history of the child, in addition to the nature of the offense
committed, can a judge make an appropriate decision furthering the stated goals of
treatment and rehabilitation. Id. But see Catherine Erin Naughton, The Cry of a Child
Left Unanswered: Pennsylvania's Treatment of Battered Children Who Kill Their Parents,
98 DICK. L. REV. 85, 90-92 (1993). The Pennsylvania legislature, in light of the brutality
of some cases involving youths, have removed such cases from the original jurisdiction of
juvenile courts. Id. Public outcry resulting from such cases makes it unlikely that they
will be transferred for juvenile adjudication notwithstanding the fact that the goal should
be on rehabilitating the juvenile offender. Id.
125 See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J., dis-
senting) (stating serious youth offenders today are packed off to adult prisons where they
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Indeed, the possibility that juvenile offenders may be an in-
creased risk to society 126 upon their release 27 as a result of their
prison experiences 128 and the nature of their confinement1 29 is
often overlooked. It is submitted that placing these serious
youth offenders into the adult court system without the prelimi-
nary determination of whether rehabilitation is feasible, serves
to obliterate the twin goals of New York's modern juvenile sys-
tem. The subjection of the youthful criminal to "just desserts" is
merely a placebo for the public's fear.130 Sending a child through
serve their time with hardened criminals forgoing any possibility of rehabilitation).
126 See Beatty, supra note 4, at 1012 (noting high recidivism rate for juveniles incar-
cerated in adult prisons); see also Giardino, supra note 13, at 273-74 (setting forth that
sending juveniles to adult court does not respond to problem of serious juvenile crime
effectively); cf. Kane, supra note 19, at 940 (noting that even if juvenile offender is
waived back to family court, damage has already occurred because publicity and stigma
from adult court has already attached).
127 See Laureen D'Ambra, A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juve-
nile Offenders is Not a Panacea, 2 ROGER WM. U. L. REV. 277, 298 (1997). Advocates of
punitive juvenile systems fail to consider that numerous criminals in adult prisons are
released back into society. Id. Therefore, those juveniles who are released from an adult
system lacking the ability to rehabilitate, are more likely to commit additional crimes.
Id.
128 See Kristina H. Chung, Kids Behind Bars: The Legality of Incarcerating Juveniles
in Adult Jails, 66 IND. L.J. 999, 1006 (1991) (during short periods of incarceration chil-
dren often are subjected to sexual assault, exploitation, and other physical injury by
guards [and] adult prisoners); see also BARRY KRISBERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REIN-
VENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE 173-77 (1993) (indicating that suicide rates among juveniles
in adult prisons are significantly higher than in juvenile facilities due to prevalence of
assaults against them).
129 See LARRY J. SEIGEL & JOSEPH J. SENNA, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: THEORY,
PRACTICE, AND LAW 371 (1981) (noting that poor physical conditions, overcrowding, and
limited medical facilities of adult correctional institutions make incarceration cruel and
unusual punishment for juveniles); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle
of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 471, 519 (1987) [hereinafter Juvenile Waiver Statutes] (discussing inade-
quacies of rehabilitative programs in adult jails).
130 See Schwartz, supra note 59, at 245. Commenting on the evaluation of data from
a "public opinion poll on the relationship between 'liberalism, victimization.., fear of
victimization and attitudes toward the purpose of incarceration '[i.e., to teach and reha-
bilitate or punish]', the authors note that the "[r]esults showed that both liberalism and
fear of victimization were significantly related to punitiveness." Id. at 245. Moreover:
Results showed that liberalism was 'inversely related to punitiveness' in that those
who supported government spending for social programs were less punitive. Fear of
being victimized by crime was positively related to punitiveness in that increased
fear led to increased punitiveness. The survey also indicated that direct and vicari-
ous victimization did not directly affect punitiveness. However, it appears that some
indirect effects occurred through fear .... '[D]emographic characteristics are am-
biguously related to punitiveness through a complex of other attitudinal associa-
tions-in this instance, fear and liberalism.'
Id. On the other hand, the authors also quote a 1988 field survey of 1,109 California
adults commissioned by the National Council and Delinquency which set forth the sen-
timent that a large portion of the community believe juvenile offenders should be reha-
bilitated instead of punished for their crimes. Id. As much as 84% of respondents felt thatjuveniles should not be placed in adult prisons. Id. at 242-43. In keeping with these sta-
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the adult punitive system, however, actually precipitates grave
underlying problems such as increased rates of recidivism. 1
31
Different aims motivate legislators and advocates to justify
punitive treatment of serious youth offenders. 132 Increased pu-
nitive treatments merely serve as a superficial remedy and fail
to address anyone's best interest.133 It appears that the purpose
behind the retributive approach which favors stricter incarcera-
tistics, it has been forcefully argued that the punishment of a juvenile condemns him to,
among other things, a future of poverty and crime. Id.; see also Punishment Alone Won't
Stop Juvenile Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1989, at 22. Subjecting a juvenile to "just des-
serts" was one of the ills sought to be averted through the establishment of the first U.S.
juvenile court in Illinois in 1899. Id. Robert W. Sweet, Jr., Deinstitutionalization of
Status Offenders: In Perspective, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 389, 389-93 (1991). As Judge Gordon A.
Martin, Jr. has aptly pointed out, "Our society is hard put to contemplate rehabilitation
(even for a juvenile) when the emotions ignited by a homicide have come into play." Id.
See generally Martin, supra note 68, at 63. The author discusses the general societal
conflicts of whether to rehabilitate or punish juvenile offenders. Id.
131 See Amy M. Campbell, Trying Minors as Adults in the United States and Eng-
land: Balancing the Goal of Rehabilitation with the Need to Protect Society, 19 SUFFOLK
TRANT'L L. REV. 345, 357 (1995) (comparing lower recidivism rates in England, that does
not use punitive system to deter youth crime, as opposed to punitive systems in Amer-
ica); see also JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT OF 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-415, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. §§ 5283-84 (stating purpose was to improve quality of juvenile
justice and provide alternatives to confinement); id. § 5285 (noting increase in crimes and
high rate of recidivism among juveniles and suggesting that preventing juvenile delin-
quency should serve as means for preventing juvenile crime); id. § 5289 (underlying Act
is implicit belief that incarceration in large statewide institutions is ineffective method of
treatment for juvenile offenders); United States v. Bilbo, 19 F.3d 912, 915 (5th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing that effect of Act is to remove child from criminal proceedings in order to
avoid stigma of criminal conviction). But see Barbara J. Valliere, The Transfer of Juvenile
Offenders to Adult Courts in Massachusetts: Reevaluating the Rehabilitative Ideal, 20
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 989, 992 (1986) (asserting that repeat juvenile offenders pose danger
to juvenile system due to their unwillingness to rehabilitate, thus encouraging negative
public response to system).
132 See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 8, at 335 (discussing that support for trans-
ferring youths to adult court from desire to avoid using limited funding of juvenile sys-
tem for those children who are "lost causes"); see also Martin, supra note 68, at 83
(stating waiver process in theory provides safety valve for public hostility and frustration
stemming from limits of juvenile justice system); Schwartz, supra note 59, at 241
(discussing public attitude toward juvenile crime advocates punitive stance toward ju-
venile offenders based on fear of being victimized); Elizabeth Neuffer, Detention vs. In-
carceration: Rise in Murders Renews Call to Classify Youths as Adults, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 23, 1990, at 1 (discussing public fear of increased juvenile crime and call for tougher
legislative sanctions). But see Sandra E. Skovron et al., The Death Penalty for Juveniles:
An Assessment of Public Support, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 546, 550 (1989) (commenting on
overwhelming opposition to imposition of death penalty for juveniles, derived, at least in
part, from parens patriae rationale).
133 See Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 130, at 519 (noting that "get tough legis-
lation seldom addresses the consequences for youths of incarceration in adult correc-
tional facilities, the quality of effectiveness of programs available to them or the com-
parative effects of juvenile versus adult dispositions on recidivism"); Sheffer, supra note
11, at 500 (noting juvenile violent arrest rate has significantly increased according to FBI
data between 1988 and 1992). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS
AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 104-110 (1995) (listing statistical data involving ju-
venile crime).
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tion for juveniles does not deter crime. 134 Contrary to public be-
liefs that harsher systems yield harsher treatments, 135 juveniles
in adult court do not always receive longer and harsher sen-
tences. 136 The rationale underlying this result stems from the
134 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 404 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(noting that because it is unlikely that juvenile offenders engage in careful calculations
prior to their actions, goal of deterrence will never be met with such children); Anna
Richo, Mandatory Sentencing for Habitual Juvenile Youth Offenders: People v. J.A., 34
DEPAUL L. REV. 1089, 1104 n.132 (1995) (detailing research suggesting longer, harsher
sentences inhibits rehabilitation); Sheffer, supra note 11, at 501 (calling into question
view that 'get tough' serious and habitual juvenile offender statutes, to the degree they
focus on mandatory or extended sentences, successfully deter juvenile delinquency"); see
also Fighting Crime; Don't Hop on the Get-Tough Hog Pile [hereinafter "Get Tough Hog
Pile"] STAR TRIB., MPLS-ST.PAUL, Feb. 6, 1994, at 26A ("[a]ccording to report of Campaign
for an Effective Crime Policy in Washington, D.C. mandatory minimums do not deter be-
cause most criminals are 'poor, poorly educated .... and are not likely to apply cost-
benefit analysis before engaging in criminal behavior."').
135 See CITIZENS' COMMITTEE FOR CHILDREN OF NEW YORK INC., THE EXPERIMENT
THAT FAILED: THE NEW YORK STATE JUVENILE OFFENDER LAW 132-33 (1984). In the first
five years of the NYJOL's operation, 6,951 New York City youths were arrested as al-
leged juvenile offenders. Id. The vast majority of those youths (4,770 of them) received no
criminal sanction because the case was dismissed or removed to the Family Court. Id.
664 of those arrested received sentences of probation and remained in the community;
598 received sentences of incarceration equal to those which could have been imposed by
the Family Court. Id. Fewer than 300 youths in the five year period-or only 4% of those
arrested-received sentences that were longer than they might have received from the
Family Court. Id.; PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCE SE-
VERITY FOR YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS 12-14 (1984). As early as 1984, it was reported that
in New York City youthful offenders faced a substantially lower chance of incarceration
than did older offenders. Id. Moreover, youthful violent offenders received lighter sen-
tences than older violent offenders, and that, for approximately two years after becoming
adults, youths benefited from informal lenient sentencing policies in adult courts. Id.;
Knipps, supra note 94, at 458-59. Knipps similarly notes that under NYJOL:
[A] youth arrested for a JO charge may be arraigned, tried, and sentenced in the
adult criminal court. The law requires that an indeterminate sentence of incarcera-
tion be imposed upon conviction of a JO offense. The minimum and maximum peri-
ods of incarceration are generally not as long as those prescribed for adults, but
longer than those that would be available in the Family Court.... The JO law, how-
ever, allows for some amelioration of these strict sanctions. The [adult] court-with
some limitations-may grant the defendant "Youthful Offender" status.., which
provides for the substitution of a non-criminal adjudication for the criminal convic-
tion.
Id. at 459; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(18) (McKinney 1997). Under the Juvenile Of-
fender Law of 1978, individuals thirteen years of age and older charged with murder in
the second degree, and those fourteen years and older charged with any one of fifteen
offenses thereunder are subject to prosecution as adults. Id.
136 See Cintron, supra note 32, at 1273. Cintron states that a typical formulation for
trying juveniles in the adult criminal court posits that youngsters will not be
"mollycoddled" if prosecuted as adults, and that the harsh sanctions of the adult system
will do a better job of deterring future crime. Id. Implicit in this argument are two fac-
tual assumptions: That the adult system imposes harsher sanctions and that the sanc-
tions will have a deterrent effect upon juveniles. Id. Cintron observes:
While the consistent transfer of nonviolent juvenile offenders fosters a 'get tough'
policy toward delinquency, the criminal penalties these juveniles receive in adult
criminal court fall short of severe appearance. Adult criminal courts devote their
limited resources and time to adult criminal offenders, who outnumber juveniles and
typically are more serious criminals. For the nonviolent juvenile offender, the adult
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fact that the focus in the adult system is on the severity of the
crime committed, consequently it is not likely that this system
will have an interest in a minor offense committed by juve-
niles. 137 Youthful offenders in the adult system are often dis-
criminal court offers its leftover resources- little time and effort is devoted to re-
forming the child beyond imposing small penalties. Many juveniles transferred to
adult criminal court- mostly nonviolent offenders- are simply fined or placed on
probation.
Id. at 1270-1273; see also DEAN J. CHAMPION & G. LARRY MAYS, TRANSFERRING JU-
VENILES TO CRIMINAL COURTS: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 59, 79-
80 (1991). In 1990, of all the juvenile offender cases transferred to and tried in criminal
courts, 50% resulted in probation. Id. Moreover, the ever-increasing rate at which juve-
niles are transferred to adult criminal courts suggests that transfer "waivers appear to
be cosmetic, primarily public-placating 'escape valves' used to rid juvenile courts of
chronic recidivists, largely property offenders." Id. at 80. On a related note, however,
California's strict enforcement of its "Three Strikes and You're Out" statute to juvenile
offenders, has yielded a decidedly controversial and unanticipated result:
Under both provisions [of the Three Strikes Law], a juvenile adjudication counts as a
prior felony conviction if the person committed a listed felony offense when he or she
was sixteen years of age or older, was found a 'fit and proper subject' for the juvenile
court, and was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court .... Using a juvenile adjudica-
tion as a strike arguably violates a person's due process rights because in the juve-
nile court system a juvenile does not have a right to a jury trial.
Id.; Lisa Forquer, California's Three Strikes Law- Should a Juvenile Adjudication Be a
Ball or a Strike?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1297, 1302 (1995) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 667
(West Supp. 1995)). The controversial California Proposition 184, passed in 1994, better
known as the "Three Strikes and You're Out" provision, has been summarized thus:
Both Three Strike provisions implemented the following mandatory sentencing
scheme. When a defendant who has a prior conviction for a 'serious' or 'violent' fel-
ony is subsequently convicted of another felony, he or she receives double the term of
punishment for the current felony conviction. If a defendant who is charged with any
felony has two or more prior 'serious' or 'violent' felony convictions, then the term of
punishment for the current felony conviction is increased to twenty-five years to life.
Both Three Strikes provisions also ensure that a convicted felon serves at least
eighty percent of his or her sentence by limiting the credits a convict can receive for
good behavior and participation to one-fifth of the total term of imprisonment.
Id. at 1299-1301.
137 See Violent Youth, supra note 37, at 1010. The author compares juvenile treat-
ment goals and adult punishment policy. Id. The criminal system model, in dealing with
severe crime, is based on an "arbitrary legislative line." Id. The juvenile court, on the
other hand, takes into account various social factors in addition to the severity of the
crime committed. Id. Arguably, the different focal points lead to inconsistencies in sen-
tencing between juvenile and adult courts. Id.; see also Fagan & Deschenes, supra note
32, at 314. Since the 1899 inception of separate juvenile courts in the U.S., the two sys-
tems have had separate goals; while the juvenile courts were committed to rehabilitative
goals, the adult criminal courts served retributive ends. Id. at 318. Further, where the
juvenile court focuses on the best interests of the child through treatment, typically adult
criminal courts emphasize the punishment of the offender based on the severity of the
crime committed. Id.; Cintron, supra note 32, at 1257-58. The philosophy underlying the
Illinois "legislature's creation of [the first U.S.] juvenile court was that the state has a
duty as parens patriae to care for those who cannot take care of themselves." Id. To this
end, the juvenile courts' philosophy, devoted to the "treatment and rehabilitation of ju-
veniles"-as opposed to the adult criminal courts' emphasis on the severity of crimes,
retribution, and incarceration-maintained that "the child who has begun to go wrong,
who is incorrigible, who has broken a law or an ordinance, is to be taken in hand by the
state, not as an enemy but as a protector, as the ultimate guardian." Id.; Arteaga, supra
note 94, at 217-18. Children were adjudged delinquent, or in need of help, in order to
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counted, since they frequently fail to receive appropriate sanc-
tions when mixed in with an overwhelming population of violent
predicate adult offenders. 138 Additionally, critics have urged that
longer sentences serve no significant deterrent value as they re-
sult in higher recidivism rates. 139
shield them from the stigma associated with being termed criminal. Id. See generally
MERRIL SOBIE, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER ACT: A STUDY OF THE ACT'S EFFECTIVENESS AND
IMPACT ON THE NEW YORK JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (1981) (discussing fact that NYJOL has
failed to decrease juvenile crime); Lucua B. Whisenand & Edward J. McLaughlin, Com-
pleting the Cycle: Reality and the Juvenile Justice System in New York State, 47 ALB. L.
REV. 1, 11-14 (1982) (explaining New York's system for adjudication of juveniles accused
of unlawful acts has practically gone full circle in one hundred years: from prosecution ofjuveniles in adult criminal courts, to adjudication in separate non-criminal system, and
then back to prosecution of some juveniles in the adult system). Id. Martin E. Kravarik,
Swamped Courts Used as Hospitals for Society's Ills, BUFF. NEWS, Oct. 13, 1996, at H5,
available in 1996 WL 5872792. Taking a "bench-eye's" view, one experienced judge has
described the current situation with the court system thus:
More cases flow onto our dockets each year, and the cases are becoming more serious
and complex. But sufficient resources ... have not been allocated to get the job done.
There was a time when our courts were relatively straightforward venues for dispute
resolution. Now they are like hospitals whose mission is to cure all of society's ills. It
has become all too obvious that our other institutions- the family, the educational
system, the church, our social and civil groups- have broken down and that the
public expects the courts to pick up the pieces.
Id.
138 See Singer & McDowall, supra note 122, at 536. Empirical analysis of juvenile
arrest rates indicate that harsher sanctions authorized by the NYJOL had not been ef-
fective in reducing juvenile crime levels. Id.; see also Knipps, supra note 94, at 456
(quoting BRADFORD PIERCE, A HALF CENTURY WITH JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: THE NEW
YORK HOUSE OF REFUGE AND ITS TIMES (Patterson Smith 1969)). A nineteenth century
DA explained the problem of low conviction for juveniles thus:
'[A] lad of fourteen or fifteen years of age might have been arrested and tried four or
five times for petty thefts, and it was hardly ever that a jury would convict. They
would rather that the culprit, acknowledged to be guilty, should be discharged alto-
gether, than be confined in the prisons of our State and county.'
Id. Knipps illustrates that in the case of two New York youths accused of attempting to
stab to death their foster father and of plotting to murder their foster family, it was re-
ported that despite the fact that the law allows them to be prosecuted as adults, the law
does not allow adult-level punishment. Id.; John Caher, Prosecutor Plans to Try Foster
Boys as Adults: Two Implicated in Failed Murder Plot, TIMES UNION (ALB.) March 27,
1996, at B1, available in 1996 WL 9536128. Effectively, youthful offenders also escape
sanctions when processed through the juvenile system: "Of the 1,625 JO cases disposed of
statewide in 1991, 67% were either dismissed or removed to the Family Court. Of the 546
youths who were convicted as JO's, 68% received YO status and 74% of these received
sentences of probation." Id.
139 See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 8, at 362. The authors articulate reasons for
eliminating lengthy sentencing. Id.; Kane, supra note 19, at 954-55. This author notes
that the high rate of recidivism is attributable to the dehumanizing conditions that less
serious juvenile offenders are subjected to when incarcerated in training schools. Id.; see
also Baird & Samuels, supra note 46, at 180-81. By getting tough on youth crime, this
country is moving away from the rehabilitation of these offenders. Id. As a result, more
and more juveniles will be unable to reintegrate into society as productive citizens. Id.;
Jeffrey Fagan, Social and Legal Policy Dimensions of Violent Juvenile Crime, 17 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 93, 99-101 (1990). Several studies reveal that "institutionalization does
not result in lower recidivism rates than nonincarcerative sanctions with close supervi-
sion .... but may actually worsen it." Id. at 101. Other studies, bespeaking the futility of
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If the original philosophies of the juvenile system still hold
their weight today, then children who are deemed unable to fully
understand the effects of their actions will in turn also be unable
to understand the effects of punishment. 140 It seems that since
only a small percentage of juvenile delinquents are "serious
youth offenders,"'141 subjecting all juveniles to criminal court
risks the fate of a few without gaining anything for the many.
Furthermore, it is noted that over the past decade serious youth
crimes in New York have increased dramatically, 142 refuting the
notion that tougher sanctions constitute greater deterrence.
14 3
New York's present juvenile justice system, suggest that juvenile recidivism is fast ap-
proaching 90% in New York State. Id.; c.f Campbell, supra note 131, at 357. The author
compared U.S. statistics with those of England to demonstrate that rehabilitation results
in decreased recidivism, whereas punishment results in increased crime. Id.
140 See Scheffer, supra note 11, at 501 (noting researchers' question whether many
serious youth offenders respond to punishment); Claudia Worrell, Pretrial Detention of
Juveniles: Denial of Equal Protection Masked By the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 95 YALE
L.J. 174, 193 n.70 (1985) (reasoning that although goal of juvenile courts is not punish-
ment, if juvenile does not perceive punishment as just or deserved, there is no deterrent
to criminal behavior); see also Von Hirsch, supra note 117, at 72 (pointing out that "[tihe
severity of the penalty carries implications of degree of reprobation.... [i.e.,] sending
someone away for several years connotes that he is more to be condemned than does
jailing him for a few months or putting him on probation"); Sheffer, supra note 11, at 500
(noting that as between serious and habitual juvenile offender programs (SHJO) and "get
tough" statutes, latter have proven ineffective).
141 See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, THE JUVENILE COURT'S RESPONSE TO VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS: 1985-89
(1993) (stating violent juvenile offenders amount to only seven percent of all delinquency
cases); see also Forst & Blomquist, supra note 8, at 357 (noting serious youth offenders
make up only fraction in American juvenile court).
142 See George B. Smith & Gloria M. Dabiri, The Judicial Role in the Treatment of
Juvenile Delinquents, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 347, 360-62 (1995). New York juvenile delinquency
statutes are consistent with the national trend. Id.; see also Sharon K. Hamric-Weis, The
Trend of Juvenile Justice in the United States, England, and Ireland, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L.
567, 567 (1995). One account estimated that in 1995, New York had the highest rate of
teenagers admitted to state detention facilities of whom the most violent crimes had been
committed in the previous ten years. Id.; Lara Jakes, Record Number of New York Teens
in Detention for Crimes, TIMES UNION (ALBANY), Sept. 30, 1996, at Al, available in 1996
WL 12034727. One prison industry insider has made some particularly elucidating ob-
servations regarding the dramatic increase in criminal activity:
[B]eginning in the late 1980's, after a decade of relative instability, the violent crime
arrest rate for juveniles soared .... The advent of crack cocaine in the mid-1980's
certainly played a role in these crime patterns. The addictiveness and profit poten-
tial of crack quickly established a market in which children could sell drugs to chil-
dren. The money represented the only economic game in town. With funds to buy
weapons and the incentive to use them to protect their markets and themselves,
many urban areas became particularly dangerous places.
Id.
143 See Greer, supra note 116, at 889 (questioning connection between increasing
rates of juvenile crime and conclusion that juvenile justice system is failing); cf. Knipps,
supra note 94, at 457 (noting that motivations of juvenile justice system were to promote
children's welfare by shielding them from harsh adult sanctions as well as providing
services to hasten their reform).
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Adult jails have inadequate educational programs and treat-
ment to help juveniles cope with their violent behavior, 144 thus
providing less opportunities to successfully re-integrate juveniles
back into society. 145 The positive effects of rehabilitation on
these impressionable youths are worthwhile, 146 not only for the
individual's sake, but for the community into which he or she
will be released. 147 Under the present system in New York, the
serious youth offender, who had a possibility of avoiding a life of
crime, is deprived of the chance for rehabilitation when forced to
serve his sentence in an adult prison. 148
144 See Beatty, supra note 4, at 1014 (reporting studies finding adult facilities and
their staff provide inadequate educational programs and opportunities to develop skills
necessary to cope with their violent tendencies and assimilate them back into society).
145 See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 8, at 361. The authors describe the effective-
ness of current imprisonment schemes. Id.; Lauren Tarshis, What Makes Teens Violent?,
SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Feb. 11, 1994, at 10. Juveniles jailed in adult courts must respond
to the "culture of violence" that exists in these jails in order to survive their period of in-
carceration. Id. Teenagers carry these violent experiences, which are ingrained in their
minds, into society when they are released. Id. Indeed, one probable result of this reality
is that: "Confined youth are likely to find overcrowding and other dangerous conditions:
about half of all confined juveniles are in facilities that exceed their design capacity, and
many facilities have substantial deficiencies in the areas of security, education, manage-
ment of suicidal behavior, and health care." Id.; see also Hamric-Weis, supra note 143, at
572. Amidst this debate of the dubiousness of incarcerating juveniles in adult facilities,
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 has been criticized as en-
couraging that "the rehabilitation of young offenders" take "a back seat to the punish-
ment of violent offenders, and as such, is a serious mistake". Id.; Patricia Puritz et al.,
Due Process Advocacy Project Report; Seeking Better Representation for Young Offenders,
10-Wtr CRIM. JUST. 14, 14 (1996). "Generally, juveniles sentenced to adult prisons are
housed separately from adult prisoners but subject to policies and procedures similar to
those applicable to adults, including the same health services, educational, vocational
and work opportunities and recreational facilities." Id. Sander N. Rothchild, Beyond In-
carceration: Juvenile Sex Offender Treatment Programs Offer Youths a Second Chance, 4
J.L. & POL'Y 719, 741 (1996). Confinement in adult prisons has caused severe damage
and potential recidivism due to the physical and psychological abuse that so many of
them endure. Id. at 741-42.
146 Hamric-Weis, supra note 143, at 572 (emphasizing importance of rehabilitation
for youths).
147 See id. at 572 (noting positive responses to rehabilitative treatment at early
stage); see also Beatty, supra note 4, at 1013 (stating it is only logical that individual who
has received personal treatment with complete rehabilitation in mind while confined
within juvenile system will be less threatening to society); Sheffer, supra note 11, at 482
(defining rehabilitation as that which serves to treat, not punish); Erica Goode, Battling
Deviant Behavior, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 19, 1994, at 74 (noting that under-
standing behavior behind commission of sex crimes is more cost efficient than incarcerat-
ing such offenders); c.f. Rothchild, supra note 146, at 721-22 (noting without rehabilita-
tion juvenile child sex offenders will continue pattern of criminal behavior).
148 See Acton, supra note 38, at 292. Acton argues that:
[T]he nation has a significant interest in rehabilitating children through the juvenile
justice system, not only for the sake of the individual child, but also out of concern
for the greater society. Before casually accepting gubernatorial initiatives that in-
crease juvenile adjudication in adult courts, it would be wise for legislatures to con-
sider [the possibility of promulgating a more rehabilitative model].
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IV. RE-ADOPTING A DISCRETIONARY FRAMEWORK IN FAMILY
COURT WILL SERVE TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
Empowering Family Court judges with more discretion fosters
the legislative goal of protecting society, as well as serving the
best interest of the child. 149 This Note asserts that a return to
Id.; Violent Youth, supra note 37, at 1011. The developmental continuum, which occurs
in adolescents, does not allow them to change from irresponsible children to responsible
adults immediately. Id. There is a strong link between age and increase in development
of criminal nature, with rates of criminality reaching a peak in mid to late adolescence.
Id.
The currently fashionable 'Three Strikes and You're Out' sentencing policy is an ex-
ample of ... misguided emphasis [on punishment]. By the time typical adult [and ju-
venile] offenders accumulate the prior record necessary to qualify for such
[sentencing] enhancements, they are often on the down-cycle of criminal activity.
Non-discriminate incarceration of all such offenders likely will result in geriatric
prisons housing older offenders with low probabilities of recidivism."
Id. at 1128 n.197; Larsen, supra note 4, at 841-42. In reemphasizing the importance of a
juvenile's "rehabilitation" as the primary role of juvenile and family courts, we are re-
minded that:
[Juvenile justice] reformers believed that children's' behavior was merely reflecti[ve]
of the environment, and that treatment, not punishment, was the appropriate solu-
tion. They wished to remove the juvenile offenders from a system of punishment to
an atmosphere that was conducive to rehabilitation. The reformers presumed that
these juveniles, once removed from the culpable environment, could be treated and
returned to society. Reformers believed that this kind of nurturing could overcome
most of nature's defects as well as the environment's negative influences.
Id.
149 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 353.5(2)(a)-(e) (Gould 1996). In determining whether to
invoke restrictive placement of an adjudicated juvenile offender, the Family Court is re-
quired to consider among other factors, the best interests of the child, any prior record,
the child's background, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the need to protect
the community and the age and physical condition of the victim of the crime. Id.; Kane,
supra note 19, at 946-47. In thus referring to New York's Juvenile Justice Reform Act of
1976, 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 878, the "Designated Felony Act", Kane observed that:
The 1976 Act has affected judicial discretion in another way; it has formally laid out
what factors a judge must consider when determining whether a restrictive place-
ment is required. Most notably, the judge must now weigh the need for protection of
the community, as well as the best interests of the child. The judge must formally
consider all factors before deciding which placement is appropriate.
Id. It is the judge who has the responsibility of balancing the protection of society with
serving the best interests of the child. Id. The New York Designated Felony Act of 1976
was created in part to layout the factors a judge should consider when determining the
fate of a juvenile offender. Id.; Whisenand & McLaughlin, supra note 138, at 12. In New
York, the issue of balancing the legislative goals of protecting society while serving the
best interests of the child was first addressed in 1824, when laws were first passed
authorizing the establishment of criminal courts to place children below sixteen into New
York's "House of Refuge." Id. In taking deprived and otherwise at-risk children into the
"House" where they were "treated," the belief was that rehabilitation was possible since
they were young and "not yet set in their ways". Id. at 5; see also Arteaga, supra note 94,
at 237. In keeping with these purposes New York has implemented a variation on this
theme via the Family Court Act. Id. Children between the ages of seven and sixteen are
subjected to an adjudicative proceeding to determine whether they actually committed
the act accused of. Id. Upon a finding of guilt, the judge is to impose the "least restric-
tive" judgment while keeping in mind the best interests of the child and the protection of
the community. Id.
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the discretionary approach would balance the needs of the indi-
vidual offender and of the public. Opponents of increased juve-
nile court discretion argue that introducing arbitrary decision
making in the system would create rampant abuse and allow for
discrimination in the juvenile process, thus compromising the in-
tegrity of the Family Court. 150 The credibility of the Family
Court is already compromised when the "harder cases" are
automatically assigned to the criminal courts. This indicates
that the juvenile system itself has failed, and that its officers
and agents are incapable of handling the hard-line cases.
15 1
150 See Knipps, supra note 94, at 455.
In the continuing debate over appropriate responses to juvenile crime, some have
advocated for a change in the current 'mix' of models, with greater reliance upon the
adult system, if not complete abolition of the juvenile court. Interestingly enough,
two completely opposite analyses have been advanced in support of this position.
Some of the critics assert that the Family Court's role should be reduced because it is
too lenient to deal effectively with today's young offenders. Others, however, urge a
change because they believe the Family Court approach is-covertly-too punitive.
Id.; Bruce Fein, Domain of Dangerous Judicial Dottiness, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996,
at A12. The author recounts an incident where a jacket search of a fifteen year old by a
high school guard resulted in the dismissal of the charges against the juvenile based on
the Fourth Amendment theory of illegal search and seizure. Id. In reaction to these facts,
Fein queries: "Could rational parents escape malparenting or child neglect prosecutions
for voluntarily entrusting their children to the custody of a school system so legally ar-
rested in seeking a safe and secure learning environment? The case for finding maljudg-
ing in [this case] seems even stronger." Id. On a related note, if a grand jury finds that
the evidence is insufficient to establish reasonable cause that the person committed an
act for which one under sixteen may be criminally responsible, it may vote to file a re-
quest to remove the charge to the Family Court. Id.; see also People v. Harris, 100 Misc.
2d 736, 737 420 N.Y.S.2d 102, 102 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1979). Moreover, the criminal
court has discretion to remove an accused juvenile offender to Family Court before sub-
mitting a case for grand jury indictment. Id.; Vega v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 543, 548 393 N.E.2d
450, 453 (N.Y. 1979). Increased discretion on the part of Family Court judges would likely
circumvent the effects of the phenomenon of "prisonization." Id.,Arteaga, supra note 94,
at 245 n.111.
'Prisonization' acts a 'counter-deterrent,' because the longer a juvenile stays in a
training school subjected to anti-social ... behavior, the likelihood of recidivism in-
creases. This 'prisonization' process is even harder for those youths who are forced to
serve time in adult correctional facilities. Their experience can never be said to serve
anything other than a retributive purpose.
Id.; Curt Schleier, Judge Dread: Tough Family Court Jurist Lays Down the Law When it
Comes to Dealing with Juvenile Justice, DET. NEWS, March 19, 1996, at El, available in
1996 WL 2912972. The controversy over whether New York Family Court judges may
sometimes wield too much discretion or authority has played no small role in the legacy
of Family Court Judge Judy Scheindlin. Id. The discretion is made even more muddled
where Schleier describes Scheindlin as saying:
'I have no patience with arrogant punks who shun responsibility for violent crimes,'
writes Scheindlin, whose book (Don't Pee on My Leg and Tell Me It's Raining) bills
her as America's toughest Family Court judge. 'I have no patience with stoned-out
grandmothers, absentee fathers or teen-age mothers. I have no patience with mili-
tant loudmouths who tell you that criminals are not responsible for what they do.'
Id.
151 See Kurt Olsson, Juvenile Justice: Where Have We Been, Where Are We Going?
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Judicial discretion was an essential mechanism in the tradi-
tional juvenile system. 152 Critics purport that "judicial discretion
is meaningless if there are no alternatives for the judge to choose
from." 15 3 New York policy-makers must seek out these alterna-
(Teleconference with Juvenile Correction Officers; John Wilson; Linda Albrecht),
CORRECTIONS TODAY, April 1, 1996 at 162 available in 1996 WL 13116204 (quoting
statement of John Wilson). Scholars have noted that the reason the juvenile justice sys-
tem is perceived to be ineffective is because it lacks the resources. Id. This system has
also seemingly failed due to the dramatic increase in abuse and neglect cases among
children along with the reallocation of money from delinquency areas of the court. Id.;
Simon Singer, Adult Courts Won't Solve Our Problem with Kids Who Commit Violent
Crimes, BUFF. NEWS, Sept. 29, 1996 at H2, available in 1996 WL 5869926. In response to
the latest trend calling for juvenile justice system reform in New York in light of the
courts' perceived failure in curtailing the rise of juvenile crime, Singer posits:
Why not abolish the whole juvenile-justice system? The reasons for not rushing to
make more juveniles criminally responsible go beyond the politics of the moment and
relate to a long history of thinking about children and teenagers as separate from
adults.... The wait-and-see attitude in the Family Court has left many kids who
need services without any services at all. Waiting for them to do something awful
like rob or kill is not the way the juvenile justice system was intended to be. Replac-
ing the Family Court system is not the answer either, for it assumes that the crimi-
nal justice system is willing and able to deal with juveniles as adult offenders when
everyone knows that's not what they are.... The answer is that we must get beyond
the rhetoric and look deep inside both our juvenile and criminal justice systems. We
need to do something about juvenile justice so that it meets societal needs to see
more than just a simple choice between treatment and punishment.
Id. Sarah Metzgar, Youth Crime Pact Gives Pataki a Lift, TIMES UNION (ALB.) Feb. 5,
1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 3481399. Nothwithstanding the above plea, on Febru-
ary 4, 1997 Governor Pataki announced "a proposal to reform the state's juvenile justice
system, calling for tougher sentences and changes to the Family Court system." Id.
Metzgar points out that:
The bill calls for changes to the state's youthful offender laws, so youths would lose
the special 'youthful offender' status if they commit an additional violent felony
within five years... Other provisions of the bill change Family Court procedures:
Family Court judges would be allowed to issue search warrants. They would lose
their discretion to dismiss cases if a defendant's guilt is established. Victims would
get the right to speak in court. Judges would be able to require a parent to partici-
pate in treatment. Family Court proceedings would be open to the public.
Id.; Assault Counts in Delinquency Bid Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction, N.Y.L.J. June
21, 1996 at p.25, col. 1. Perhaps inadvertently supporting the urgent need for juvenile
justice system reform is the following account of justice gone amiss:
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding in Family Court, respondent teenager moved to
dismiss counts of the petition alleging she was an adult. If found guilty, she would be
deemed criminally responsible by statute. As the case was not first brought in New
York City Criminal Court charging her as a juvenile offender and then removed,
Family Court said it lacked jurisdiction. The counts were dismissed.
Id.
152 See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 215-6 (1980) (discussing judge's role in
"treating" juvenile is to begin with consideration of child's socioeconomic status, family
situation and past record, focusing on child's needs as opposed to guilt or innocence).
153 See Kane, supra note 19, at 954; Metzgar, supra note 153, at Al (reporting on
Pataki's proposal to effectively broaden judicial discretion and alternatives currently
available to Family Court judges); see also Piersma, supra note 117, at 13 (discussing de-
termination of when children are treated as status offenders); cf. Von Hirsch, supra note
117, at 62 (noting "[s]everity of punishment should be commensurate with the serious-
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tives in order to make New York's juvenile institutions more
humane and effective. 154 In light of the evidence supporting the
proposition that more punishment does not necessarily yield a
lower recidivism rate, legislators as well as the public should
realize that institutionalism is not effective. 
155
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the question of how to respond to violent youth
crime is one of the most important issues facing both society and
the integrity of New York's juvenile justice system. Before im-
plementing hasty and rash policies, the long term consequences
concerning individual adolescents and society need to be as-
sessed. To achieve these ends, allowing Family Court judges a
wide discretionary berth in adjudicating juvenile matters would
better serve the child's best interests and the promotion of long-
term societal interests. Judge Julian Mack, an original propo-
nent of the juvenile court, stated that it was a judge's obligation
ness of the wrong," and only "grave wrongs merit severe penalties; minor misdeeds de-
serve lenient punishments").
154 See Fox Butterfield, More States Try Juveniles as Adults, PITr. POST-GAZETTrE
May 12, 1996, at A9, available in 1996 WL 7657414. Butterfield notes that:
In the most drastic changes to the juvenile justice system since the founding of the
first family court a century ago, almost all 50 states have overhauled their laws in
the past two years, allowing more youths to be tried as adults and scrapping long-
time protections like the confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings. ... Proponents
of the changes say getting tough with teenagers is the only way to stop the epidemic
of juvenile crime .... [P]ublic safety and victim's rights issues [are] as important as
protecting the child's interest.
Id.; Assault Counts in Delinquency Bid Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction, supra note
152, at 25. As the article shows, the current setup of New York's juvenile justice system
sometimes leads to very "injudicious" results, bespeaking of the system's ineffectiveness
and need for reform. Id.; see also Singer, supra note 152, at H2. In seeking to implement
effective reform, the author aptly calls for the striking of a balance in such a way that
juvenile justice meets societal needs and is not reduced merely to a simple choice be-
tween treatment and punishment. Id. In Knipps, supra note 94, at 455. The author out-
lines the debate of how to deal fairly and effectively with the problem of juvenile crime in
New York in light of the competing emphases behind the Family Court Act and The Ju-
venile Offender Law, respectively. Id.
155 See Punishment Alone Won't Stop Juvenile Crime, supra note 130, at 22 (arguing
that punishment of juveniles condemns them to, among other things, future of poverty
and crime); Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415,
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., at § 5285 (noting increase in crimes and high rate of recidivism
among juveniles); Greenwood et. al., supra note 135, at 12-14 (reporting youthful violent
offenders received lighter sentences than older violent offenders and, after becoming
adults, youths still benefited from lenient sentencing policies of adult courts); Kane, su-
pra note 19, at 954-55 (noting that incarcerating less serious juvenile offenders with
more hardened violent and serious juvenile offenders deprives former of any effective re-
habilitation and in turn only breeds high degree of recidivism).
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in assessing a juvenile offender
to find out what he is physically, mentally, and morally, and
then, if... [the judge] learns [the juvenile] is treading the
path that leads to criminality, to take him in charge, not so
much to punish as to reform, not to degrade but to uplift, not
to crush but to develop, not to make him a criminal but a
worthy citizen. 156
Rose M. Charles and Jennifer V. Zuccarelli
156 See Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court as a Legal Institution, 23 HARV. L. REV.
104, 115 (1909) (discussing principle that "courts should be agencies for the rescue as
well as the punishment of children").
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